# Improved Revenue Guarantees for Selling Separately and Bundling

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.28873 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.28873/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- First posted on arXiv 24 Sep 2026.

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Cogentic: Multi-Agent Orchestration for Automated Proof Discovery](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.40324/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We study how much revenue a seller can lose by restricting attention to selling separately or grand bundling, in the setting of a single additive buyer with independent item values. Although revenue-optimal mechanisms can require lotteries and infinite menus, Babaioff, Immorlica, Lucier, and Weinberg showed that the better of these two simple formats always achieves a constant fraction of optimal revenue. We prove that OPT ≤ 3.52 maxSREV, BREV, where SREV and BREV are the optimal revenues from selling separately and grand bundling, respectively. This improves the previous best-known approximation factor of 5.2 due to Ma and Simchi-Levi and narrows the gap to the known lower bound of 2.