# Evolutionary Stability Does Not Guarantee Learning Accessibility: A Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning Perspective on Cooperation Emergence

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.27664 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.27664/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 11 of its 35 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 23 Sep 2026.

## Builds on (most cited first, 11 of 11)

- [Multi-Agent Actor-Critic for Mixed Cooperative-Competitive Environments](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1706.02275/) (2017)
- [Counterfactual Multi-Agent Policy Gradients](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1705.08926/) (2017)
- [The StarCraft Multi-Agent Challenge](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1902.04043/) (2019)
- [Learning to Communicate with Deep Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1605.06676/) (2016)
- [Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning: A Selective Overview of Theories and Algorithms](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1911.10635/) (2019)
- [QTRAN: Learning to Factorize with Transformation for Cooperative Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1905.05408/) (2019)
- [Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning in Sequential Social Dilemmas](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1702.03037/) (2017)
- [A Survey and Critique of Multiagent Deep Reinforcement Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1810.05587/) (2018)
- [Learning Attentional Communication for Multi-Agent Cooperation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1805.07733/) (2018)
- [ROMA: Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning with Emergent Roles](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2003.08039/) (2020)
- [Cooperative Exploration for Multi-Agent Deep Reinforcement Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2107.11444/) (2021)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Cooperation emergence is a central problem in multi-agent systems because decentralized agents must coordinate while adapting to the changing behavior of others. Evolutionary game theory identifies strategically stable outcomes, but stability under a population adjustment dynamic need not imply that finite-sample learning agents can reach the same outcome through local reward feedback. We study this distinction in a transparent three-agent governance-motivated game involving a government, a platform firm, and users. We derive replicator dynamics for the fixed stage-game incentives, evaluate the cooperative evolutionary basin on a symmetric initial-condition grid, and compare it with learning-basin estimates for three decentralized value-based learners. The learning analysis uses independent Q-learning with varepsilon-greedy action selection, scaled Boltzmann exploration, and SA--EA BQL under the same payoff environment and outcome criterion. The evolutionary basin has volume VE=1.00 on the sampled grid. The empirical learning basin is 0.88 for varepsilon-IQL and 0.00 for both scaled Boltzmann and SA--EA BQL. Diagnostic traces show that broader action diversity and nonzero value separation can coexist with failure to sustain the cooperative joint action in this fixed configuration. These results indicate that evolutionary stability and learning accessibility are distinct properties of a coupled game--learning system. The shared-bike setting is a motivating application; the broader contribution is a framework for comparing population-level stability with the finite-sample accessibility of cooperation under specified multi-agent learning dynamics.