# CausalLoss-Fin: Attributing Financial-Agent Loss to Decisions and Infrastructure Faults

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.25960 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.25960/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 8 of its 12 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 22 Sep 2026.

## Builds on (most cited first, 8 of 8)

- [Rethinking Failure Attribution in Multi-Agent Systems: A Multi-Perspective Benchmark and Evaluation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.25001/) (2026)
- [Causal Agent Replay: Counterfactual Attribution for LLM-Agent Failures](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.08275/) (2026)
- [CausalFlow: Causal Attribution and Counterfactual Repair for LLM Agent Failures](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.25338/) (2026)
- [REFLECT: Intervention-Supported Error Attribution for Silent Failures in LLM Agent Traces](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.09071/) (2026)
- [DCFA: Dual-view Causal-inspired Attribution for Failure Reasoning in LLM-based Multi-agent Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.04749/) (2026)
- [Causely: A Causal Intelligence Layer for Enterprise AI A Benchmark Study on SRE and Reliability Workflows](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.18327/) (2026)
- [When Failures Propagate: Causal Failure Attribution in Agentic Retrieval-Augmented Generation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.20627/) (2026)
- [FinalityBench: An Effect-Level Benchmark for Agent Decisions Under Delayed and Conflicting Financial Finality](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.04706/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

When an agent handling a payment exception loses money, the agent-step attribution methods this paper compares against will name one of its actions. They will do so even when a settlement message was dropped and the agent never had a chance: they intervene on agent actions and do not expose infrastructure faults as intervenable variables, so every dollar they explain is charged to a decision. We take a benchmark whose fault process is explicit and replayable, decompose each episode's realised delivery schedule into named, individually repairable messages, and intervene on both the agent's choices and the infrastructure's. A telescoping identity splits any policy's loss exactly three ways: an infrastructure effect, a policy differential against the best implementable policy, and a reference-policy residual. Two of the three can be negative, so none is a share; Shapley then divides the first into signed allocations over individual messages. One result is structural and needs no corpus: an agent-only baseline identifies no infrastructure cause, because its model contains no variable that could name one. What 545 planted episodes across 3 policies measure is the size of that consequence. It misfiles 100% of infrastructure episodes and charges 114,383.40 to the agent. Repairing what it names recovers 0.0% of the available loss; repairing a minimal sufficient set recovers 100.0%. Scoring messages one at a time is not merely imprecise: 27.8% (95% CI: 23.3--32.3%) of episodes do not decompose additively. We evaluate deterministic programmatic policies rather than language-model agents, which is what makes replay exact and which limits external validity to stochastic agents. The prevalence figures are properties of this generator, not field rates.