# RAG-NAROK: Retrieval-Aware Knowledge Corpus Poisoning in RAG with Source-specific Refutation

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.25469 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.25469/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Privacy and security of RAG, one of 15 directions in Retrieval-augmented generation.
- Builds on 23 of its 26 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 21 Sep 2026.

## Placed in

- Retrieval-augmented generation / [Privacy and security of RAG](https://mlsanity.com/rag/privacy-and-security-of-rag/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 23 of 23)

- [Language Models are Few-Shot Learners](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2005.14165/) (2020)
- [Retrieval-Augmented Generation for Knowledge-Intensive NLP Tasks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2005.11401/) (2020)
- [Judging LLM-as-a-Judge with MT-Bench and Chatbot Arena](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.05685/) (2023)
- [Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.15043/) (2023)
- [Locating and Editing Factual Associations in GPT](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2202.05262/) (2022)
- [Billion-scale similarity search with GPUs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1702.08734/) (2017)
- [Survey of Hallucination in Natural Language Generation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2202.03629/) (2022)
- [WebGPT: Browser-assisted question-answering with human feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2112.09332/) (2021)
- [Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injection](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.12173/) (2023)
- [Ignore Previous Prompt: Attack Techniques For Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2211.09527/) (2022)
- [REPLUG: Retrieval-Augmented Black-Box Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2301.12652/) (2023)
- [Dissecting Recall of Factual Associations in Auto-Regressive Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.14767/) (2023)
- [Knowledge Conflicts for LLMs: A Survey](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.08319/) (2024)
- [PoisonedRAG: Knowledge Corruption Attacks to Retrieval-Augmented Generation of Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.07867/) (2024)
- [Poisoning Retrieval Corpora by Injecting Adversarial Passages](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.19156/) (2023)
- [Tug-of-War Between Knowledge: Exploring and Resolving Knowledge Conflicts in Retrieval-Augmented Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.14409/) (2024)
- [BadRAG: Identifying Vulnerabilities in Retrieval Augmented Generation of Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.00083/) (2024)
- [TrojanRAG: Retrieval-Augmented Generation Can Be Backdoor Driver in Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.13401/) (2024)
- [TrustRAG: Enhancing Robustness and Trustworthiness in Retrieval-Augmented Generation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2501.00879/) (2025)
- [Neural Pipeline for Zero-Shot Data-to-Text Generation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.16279/) (2022)
- [Joint-GCG: Unified Gradient-Based Poisoning Attacks on Retrieval-Augmented Generation Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.06151/) (2025)
- [Do Large Language Models Favor Recent Content? A Study on Recency Bias in LLM-Based Reranking](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.11353/) (2025)
- [AdversarialCoT: Single-Document Retrieval Poisoning for LLM Reasoning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.12201/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Retrieval augmented generation (RAG) systems have emerged as the dominant architecture for grounding large language model (LLM) outputs in verifiable external knowledge, yet their structural reliance on a dynamic retrieval pipeline introduces a largely unexplored class of adversarial vulnerability. Existing knowledge-base poisoning attacks are fundamentally static. Adversarial documents are pre-computed and injected without any awareness of what the victim system will actually retrieve for a given query, leaving the attack blind to the competitive documentary landscape that surrounds its payload in the generator's context window. Unlike traditional static poisoning attacks that are blind to the retrieved context, we introduce RAG-NAROK (Retrieval-Anchored Generation Negation And Response Quality Collapse), a RAG attack framework that adapts to the query text. RAG-NAROK exploits the transparency inherent in RAG pipeline to first extract the legitimate source identities, then generate Anchor-Specific Refutation documents that explicitly name and devalue retrieved sources while leveraging recency and authority biases to steer the text generation toward a target answer. Our results demonstrate that RAG-NAROK significantly outperforms static baselines across diverse domains, revealing a fundamental tension between RAG transparency and AI security.