# A Proposal for an Agentic AI Architecture to Support Multi-Domain Decision-Making in the Brazilian Armed Forces

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.20080 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.20080/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Agentic AI for wireless networks, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use.
- Builds on 13 of its 19 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 17 Sep 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM agents and tool use / [Agentic AI for wireless networks](https://mlsanity.com/agents/agentic-ai-for-wireless-networks/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 13 of 13)

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- [Preventing Prompt Injection with Type-Directed Privilege Separation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.25926/) (2025)
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- [AgentWatcher: A Rule-based Prompt Injection Monitor](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.01194/) (2026)
- [MobiLLM: An Agentic AI Framework for Closed-Loop Threat Mitigation in 6G Open RANs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.21634/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

The growing complexity of multi-domain operational environments (land, aerospace, naval, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum) has increased the volume and velocity of data reaching command-and-control (C2) centers, straining the observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) decision cycle. Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems currently employed in defense are, in general, reactive and isolated tools that still rely heavily on human operators to integrate information, assess scenarios, and formulate courses of action. This paper proposes a conceptual Agentic AI architecture for AI systems that can plan, access data sources, execute tools, and act autonomously and audibly, aimed at supporting decision-making across the three Brazilian Armed Forces (Navy, Army, and Air Force). Four application fronts are discussed (decision support, situational analysis, feasibility studies, and countermeasure suggestion), as well as the data and sensor access requirements and the security and permission safeguards necessary for responsible employment across administrative, strategic, operational, and tactical contexts.