# Nameless Tokenization: A Lossless Tokenizer-Level Defense Against Control-Token Forgery in Open-Weight LLMs

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.16984 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.16984/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 9 of its 16 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 15 Sep 2026.

## Builds on (most cited first, 9 of 9)

- [GLUE: A Multi-Task Benchmark and Analysis Platform for Natural Language Understanding](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1804.07461/) (2018)
- [SQuAD: 100,000+ Questions for Machine Comprehension of Text](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1606.05250/) (2016)
- [Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injection](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.12173/) (2023)
- [Ignore Previous Prompt: Attack Techniques For Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2211.09527/) (2022)
- [The Instruction Hierarchy: Training LLMs to Prioritize Privileged Instructions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.13208/) (2024)
- [StruQ: Defending Against Prompt Injection with Structured Queries](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.06363/) (2024)
- [Defending Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks With Spotlighting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.14720/) (2024)
- [SecAlign: Defending Against Prompt Injection with Preference Optimization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.05451/) (2024)
- [Can LLMs Separate Instructions From Data? And What Do We Even Mean By That?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.06833/) (2024)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Open-weight language models publish the strings their chat templates use to mark turns, roles and tool results, which the tokenizer maps back to the reserved identifiers the model obeys. Anyone who controls text in a prompt can therefore write a turn boundary indistinguishable from one the serving stack wrote. We audit 256 deployed chat tokenizers. All are forgeable, and the flag usually recommended as a fix leaves 56.6% forgeable because it misses the tool and reasoning markers agent systems rely on. We propose nameless tokenization, which leaves the control entries with a reserved identifier and no surface string, so the content encoder cannot emit one and message content reaches the model unaltered. Across five tokenizer families it reproduces the standard token stream exactly on attack-free data and lifts accuracy on a probe of delimiter-bearing text from 8.5% to 59.9%, where sanitizers lose it. Separating a delimiter's appearance from its identifier shows the identifier matters little against a bare task instruction, but carries most of a forged tool result and most of any forged turn once the system message tells the model to treat user content as data.