# Empirical Evaluation of Data Poisoning Attacks in Supervised Learning

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10952 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.10952/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Backdoor and data poisoning attacks, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security.
- Builds on 6 of its 14 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 10 Sep 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM safety and security / [Backdoor and data poisoning attacks](https://mlsanity.com/safety/backdoor-and-data-poisoning-attacks/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 6 of 6)

- [Fashion-MNIST: a Novel Image Dataset for Benchmarking Machine Learning Algorithms](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1708.07747/) (2017)
- [BadNets: Identifying Vulnerabilities in the Machine Learning Model Supply Chain](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1708.06733/) (2017)
- [Just How Toxic is Data Poisoning? A Unified Benchmark for Backdoor and Data Poisoning Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2006.12557/) (2020)
- [Wild Patterns Reloaded: A Survey of Machine Learning Security against Training Data Poisoning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2205.01992/) (2022)
- [Scaling Trends for Data Poisoning in LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2408.02946/) (2024)
- [Data Poisoning in Deep Learning: A Survey](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.22759/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Data poisoning corrupts training data to degrade a model or to plant attacker-controlled behavior. This study evaluates two representative training-time attacks, label flipping and backdoor poisoning, on MNIST and Fashion-MNIST with three baseline classifiers: Logistic Regression, Linear SVM, and Random Forest. Clean training is compared with poisoning rates of 5%, 10%, and 20% using clean-test accuracy, macro-precision, macro-recall, macro-F1, and, for backdoors, attack success rate. Label flipping caused clear degradation, largest for Logistic Regression and Linear SVM, while Random Forest stayed comparatively stable. Backdoor poisoning reached attack success rates from 0.9667 to 1.0000 on both datasets and all three models while often keeping clean-test performance near baseline. The results separate indiscriminate poisoning, which shows up in standard metrics, from targeted backdoor poisoning, which stays comparatively stealthy while embedding highly effective malicious behavior, and they support security-oriented evaluation beyond conventional clean-test metrics.