# You Can't Escape Your Own Activations : Evaluation Awareness and Multi-Agent Monitoring

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.03035 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.03035/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use.
- Builds on 9 of its 14 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 2 Sep 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM agents and tool use / [Agent threats, guardrails and governance](https://mlsanity.com/agents/agent-threats-guardrails-and-governance/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 9 of 9)

- [The Geometry of Truth: Emergent Linear Structure in Large Language Model Representations of True/False Datasets](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.06824/) (2023)
- [The Internal State of an LLM Knows When It's Lying](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.13734/) (2023)
- [Monitoring Reasoning Models for Misbehavior and the Risks of Promoting Obfuscation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.11926/) (2025)
- [Large Language Models Often Know When They Are Being Evaluated](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.23836/) (2025)
- [Secret Collusion among AI Agents: Multi-Agent Deception via Steganography](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.07510/) (2024)
- [Hidden in Plain Text: Emergence & Mitigation of Steganographic Collusion in LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.03768/) (2024)
- [RL-Obfuscation: Can Language Models Learn to Evade Latent-Space Monitors?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.14261/) (2025)
- [Detecting Multi-Agent Collusion Through Multi-Agent Interpretability](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.01151/) (2026)
- [Training on Documents About Monitoring Leads to CoT Obfuscation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.15257/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

LLM agents are increasingly deployed in multi-agent systems, where they can collude while keeping their actions benign. Output monitors designed to detect such collusions can be fooled by obfuscation and steganography, motivating the use of probes trained on internal activations. However, these probes are usually evaluated on agents that do not know they are being watched. We study how activation-based detection changes when agents are explicitly informed that their internal activations are being monitored, and when they additionally receive feedback from the monitor. We keep the models, probes, and thresholds fixed and change only what the agents are told: nothing (baseline), that an activation monitor is present (aware), or that a monitor is present together with the previous round's score (feedback). We test two games, a four-agent blackjack game and a two-agent Simmons prisoners game, using Qwen3-32B-AWQ and GPT-OSS-20B in homogeneous and mixed pairings. Telling agents about the monitor does not hide them. The best probes stay accurate in all three conditions, and the agents keep colluding.