# Implicit Manipulation for Skill Selection in LLM Agents with Semantic Matching

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.02035 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.02035/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Agent skill learning and evolution, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use.
- Builds on 47 of its 72 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 2 Sep 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM agents and tool use / [Agent skill learning and evolution](https://mlsanity.com/agents/agent-skill-learning-and-evolution/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 30 of 47)

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- [Toolformer: Language Models Can Teach Themselves to Use Tools](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.04761/) (2023)
- [ToolLLM: Facilitating Large Language Models to Master 16000+ Real-world APIs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.16789/) (2023)
- [Gorilla: Large Language Model Connected with Massive APIs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.15334/) (2023)
- [AgentBench: Evaluating LLMs as Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.03688/) (2023)
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- [ConceptNet 5.5: An Open Multilingual Graph of General Knowledge](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1612.03975/) (2016)
- [OpenAI GPT-5 System Card](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.03267/) (2025)
- [A Survey of Uncertainty in Deep Neural Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2107.03342/) (2021)
- [Baseline Defenses for Adversarial Attacks Against Aligned Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.00614/) (2023)
- [InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.02691/) (2024)
- [StruQ: Defending Against Prompt Injection with Structured Queries](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.06363/) (2024)
- [Agent Security Bench (ASB): Formalizing and Benchmarking Attacks and Defenses in LLM-based Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.02644/) (2024)
- [Formalizing and Benchmarking Prompt Injection Attacks and Defenses](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.12815/) (2023)
- [Defeating Prompt Injections by Design](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.18813/) (2025)
- [MetaTool Benchmark for Large Language Models: Deciding Whether to Use Tools and Which to Use](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.03128/) (2023)
- [Prompt Injection Attack to Tool Selection in LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.19793/) (2025)
- [EASYTOOL: Enhancing LLM-based Agents with Concise Tool Instruction](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2401.06201/) (2024)
- [AgentDojo: A Dynamic Environment to Evaluate Prompt Injection Attacks and Defenses for LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.13352/) (2024)
- [Optimization-based Prompt Injection Attack to LLM-as-a-Judge](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.17710/) (2024)
- [DataSentinel: A Game-Theoretic Detection of Prompt Injection Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.11358/) (2025)
- [IsolateGPT: An Execution Isolation Architecture for LLM-Based Agentic Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.04960/) (2024)
- [The Task Shield: Enforcing Task Alignment to Defend Against Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2412.16682/) (2024)
- [ToolSword: Unveiling Safety Issues of Large Language Models in Tool Learning Across Three Stages](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.10753/) (2024)
- [Tool Documentation Enables Zero-Shot Tool-Usage with Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.00675/) (2023)
- [RewriteLM: An Instruction-Tuned Large Language Model for Text Rewriting](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.15685/) (2023)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Skill selection is a key stage in LLM-agent workflows, determining which installed skill should handle a user request. Existing attacks on this stage primarily rely on explicit prompt injection or instruction-level steering, which can expose recognizable manipulation signals. In this work, we identify a new implicit attack surface for skill selection: even when the user prompt and skill description appear benign in isolation, their semantic relationship can still be strategically shaped to favor an attacker-chosen skill. Based on this observation, we present Implicit Skill-Selection Manipulation via Semantic Matching (ISM), which jointly shapes target-skill metadata and reusable prompts to manipulate skill selection without explicit selection instructions. Specifically, we develop a three-stage strategy to broaden semantic coverage, strengthen target distinctiveness, and preserve natural prompt wording. Across four task domains and eight selector models, ISM increases the average target-selection rate (TSR) from 15.2% to 63.5%. In a matched comparison, ISM achieves a 73.5% TSR, only 9.8 percentage points below Explicit Steering. Human reviewers block ISM in only 2.9% of judgments, versus 91.4% for Explicit Steering, while five LLM-based inspectors pass ISM at an average rate of 82.9%, versus 37.4% for Explicit Steering. Moreover, ISM remains effective against PPL-W, Llama Prompt Guard 2, and PIGuard.