# Validity-Aware Jailbreak Evaluation for Large Language Models

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.00498 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.00498/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Jailbreaking, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security.
- Builds on 19 of its 90 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 31 Aug 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM safety and security / [Jailbreaking](https://mlsanity.com/safety/jailbreaking/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 19 of 19)

- [Judging LLM-as-a-Judge with MT-Bench and Chatbot Arena](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.05685/) (2023)
- [Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.15043/) (2023)
- [Jailbroken: How Does LLM Safety Training Fail?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.02483/) (2023)
- [HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusal](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.04249/) (2024)
- [FActScore: Fine-grained Atomic Evaluation of Factual Precision in Long Form Text Generation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.14251/) (2023)
- [Red Teaming Language Models with Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2202.03286/) (2022)
- [GLM-5: from Vibe Coding to Agentic Engineering](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.15763/) (2026)
- [GPTFUZZER: Red Teaming Large Language Models with Auto-Generated Jailbreak Prompts](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.10253/) (2023)
- [The WMDP Benchmark: Measuring and Reducing Malicious Use With Unlearning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.03218/) (2024)
- [WildGuard: Open One-Stop Moderation Tools for Safety Risks, Jailbreaks, and Refusals of LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.18495/) (2024)
- [Controllable Preference Optimization: Toward Controllable Multi-Objective Alignment](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.19085/) (2024)
- [The Jailbreak Tax: How Useful are Your Jailbreak Outputs?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.10694/) (2025)
- [Strategic Dishonesty Can Undermine AI Safety Evaluations of Frontier LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.18058/) (2025)
- [Comparison requires valid measurement: Rethinking attack success rate comparisons in AI red teaming](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.18076/) (2026)
- [Refining Input Guardrails: Enhancing LLM-as-a-Judge Efficiency Through Chain-of-Thought Fine-Tuning and Alignment](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2501.13080/) (2025)
- [JADES: A Universal Framework for Jailbreak Assessment via Decompositional Scoring](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.20848/) (2025)
- [GuidedBench: Measuring and Mitigating the Evaluation Discrepancies of In-the-wild LLM Jailbreak Methods](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.16903/) (2025)
- [Building Safe GenAI Applications: An End-to-End Overview of Red Teaming for Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.01742/) (2025)
- [How Real is Your Jailbreak? Fine-grained Jailbreak Evaluation with Anchored Reference](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.03288/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Jailbreak robustness has become central to large language model (LLM) safety evaluation, yet prevailing methodologies rely primarily on refusal behavior, semantic resemblance, and intent-matching heuristics that emphasize linguistic plausibility rather than correctness. We identify a key limitation in existing evaluations: many jailbreak intents depend on instructional validity rather than epistemic factuality, allowing realistic-looking responses to be labeled successful despite being factually or procedurally incorrect. To address this gap, we propose Sequential Epistemic and Action-Level Validation (SEAV), a verification-centric jailbreak evaluation framework that decomposes responses into ordered steps and evaluates both validity and correctness. SEAV combines LLM-as-a-judge mechanisms for semantic interpretation with retrieval-grounded verification using external knowledge sources, assessing whether generated content is factually correct, structurally consistent, and operationally capable of advancing harmful objectives. Empirically, SEAV cuts the false-positive rate on SD-A (a curated strategic-dishonesty diagnostic) by 14.9,pp vs. the strongest baseline, and reclassifies 22.1%--51.0% of sampled prior-labeled successes as invalid across three of four public benchmarks. Together, these results show that enforcing correctness substantially reshapes measured robustness: many previously labeled jailbreak successes are reclassified as invalid, and results are stable across the tested search backends and evaluator models. Code and data are available at https://github.com/Ardor-Wu/SEAV.