# On the Recoverability of Private Information Unlearning in Large Language Models

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29943 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.29943/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Machine unlearning, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security.
- Builds on 26 of its 29 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 30 Aug 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM safety and security / [Machine unlearning](https://mlsanity.com/safety/machine-unlearning/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 26 of 26)

- [Qwen3 Technical Report](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.09388/) (2025)
- [Direct Preference Optimization: Your Language Model is Secretly a Reward Model](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.18290/) (2023)
- [Scaling Laws for Neural Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2001.08361/) (2020)
- [Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.15043/) (2023)
- [Machine Unlearning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1912.03817/) (2019)
- [Certified Data Removal from Machine Learning Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1911.03030/) (2019)
- [TOFU: A Task of Fictitious Unlearning for LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2401.06121/) (2024)
- [The WMDP Benchmark: Measuring and Reducing Malicious Use With Unlearning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.03218/) (2024)
- [Negative Preference Optimization: From Catastrophic Collapse to Effective Unlearning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.05868/) (2024)
- [Knowledge Unlearning for Mitigating Privacy Risks in Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2210.01504/) (2022)
- [Who's Harry Potter? Approximate Unlearning in LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.02238/) (2023)
- [Descent-to-Delete: Gradient-Based Methods for Machine Unlearning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2007.02923/) (2020)
- [Large Language Model Unlearning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.10683/) (2023)
- [In-Context Unlearning: Language Models as Few Shot Unlearners](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.07579/) (2023)
- [Are Large Pre-Trained Language Models Leaking Your Personal Information?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2205.12628/) (2022)
- [Eight Methods to Evaluate Robust Unlearning in LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.16835/) (2024)
- [Can Sensitive Information Be Deleted From LLMs? Objectives for Defending Against Extraction Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.17410/) (2023)
- [Counterfactual Memorization in Neural Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2112.12938/) (2021)
- [Continual Learning and Private Unlearning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.12817/) (2022)
- [Large Language Model Unlearning via Embedding-Corrupted Prompts](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.07933/) (2024)
- [Preventing Verbatim Memorization in Language Models Gives a False Sense of Privacy](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2210.17546/) (2022)
- [Reversing the Forget-Retain Objectives: An Efficient LLM Unlearning Framework from Logit Difference](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.08607/) (2024)
- [Unlearning or Obfuscating? Jogging the Memory of Unlearned LLMs via Benign Relearning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.13356/) (2024)
- [Catastrophic Failure of LLM Unlearning via Quantization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.16454/) (2024)
- [Do Unlearning Methods Remove Information from Language Model Weights?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.08827/) (2024)
- [Evaluating Copyright Takedown Methods for Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.18664/) (2024)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Large language models (LLMs) can memorize sensitive information, raising serious privacy concerns. Machine unlearning offers a potential solution to remove such information, but it remains unclear whether existing methods truly erase it or merely hide it within the model. A key challenge is quantifying the persistence of sensitive data under a unified evaluation framework. To address this, we construct a synthetic dataset containing fake private information and propose a white-box auditing framework to systematically assess whether claimed-forgotten information is genuinely removed. Using this framework, we evaluate five existing unlearning methods and find that a simple "inverse greedy" decoding -- selecting the least likely token at each step -- can recover supposedly forgotten private information. Our results reveal that current unlearning approaches often fail to fully eliminate sensitive information, highlighting the need for more reliable methods to ensure privacy in deployed LLMs.