# Chain-of-Thought Faithfulness of Reasoning Models Varies with Where and How Preference Cues Are Delivered

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29464 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.29464/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Prompting and chain-of-thought reasoning, one of 17 directions in LLM reasoning.
- Builds on 23 of its 59 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 29 Aug 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM reasoning / [Prompting and chain-of-thought reasoning](https://mlsanity.com/lr/prompting-and-chain-of-thought-reasoning/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 23 of 23)

- [gpt-oss-120b & gpt-oss-20b Model Card](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.10925/) (2025)
- [Instruction-Following Evaluation for Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.07911/) (2023)
- [Measuring Faithfulness in Chain-of-Thought Reasoning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.13702/) (2023)
- [Instruction Tuning with GPT-4](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.03277/) (2023)
- [GLM-5: from Vibe Coding to Agentic Engineering](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.15763/) (2026)
- [Reasoning Models Don't Always Say What They Think](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.05410/) (2025)
- [Monitoring Reasoning Models for Misbehavior and the Risks of Promoting Obfuscation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.11926/) (2025)
- [Chain of Thought Monitorability: A New and Fragile Opportunity for AI Safety](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.11473/) (2025)
- [Chain-of-Thought Reasoning In The Wild Is Not Always Faithful](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.08679/) (2025)
- [Thought Anchors: Which LLM Reasoning Steps Matter?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.19143/) (2025)
- [Olmo 3](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2512.13961/) (2025)
- [When Chain of Thought is Necessary, Language Models Struggle to Evade Monitors](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.05246/) (2025)
- [Are DeepSeek R1 And Other Reasoning Models More Faithful?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2501.08156/) (2025)
- [SHADE-Arena: Evaluating Sabotage and Monitoring in LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.15740/) (2025)
- [Monitoring Monitorability](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2512.18311/) (2025)
- [Bias-Augmented Consistency Training Reduces Biased Reasoning in Chain-of-Thought](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.05518/) (2024)
- [Reward Hacking Benchmark: Measuring Exploits in LLM Agents with Tool Use](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.02964/) (2026)
- [Measuring Chain-of-Thought Monitorability Through Faithfulness and Verbosity](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.27378/) (2025)
- [Counterfactual Simulation Training for Chain-of-Thought Faithfulness](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.20710/) (2026)
- [Is Chain-of-Thought Really Not Explainability? Chain-of-Thought Can Be Faithful without Hint Verbalization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2512.23032/) (2025)
- [Biases in the Blind Spot: Detecting What LLMs Fail to Mention](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.10117/) (2026)
- [Quantifying the Necessity of Chain of Thought through Opaque Serial Depth](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.09786/) (2026)
- [Chain-of-Thought Monitoring Can Be Unreliable in Implicit-Influence Settings](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.04735/) (2026)

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Efficient Reasoning Training Does Not Always Harm CoT Faithfulness and Monitorability](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.03509/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring assumes that reasoning traces faithfully record the information that shapes a model's answer. Existing faithfulness tests often place explicit bias cues in the user message, while agents may encounter preferences through tool returns or raw artifacts. We introduce FACE-Eval (Faithful Attribution of Cue Effects Evaluation), a 5,100-sample evaluation that varies cue location (user message or tool return) and explicitness (direct summary or raw artifact). We measure verbalized commitment among cue-following answers and unverbalized adoption among all cued samples. We evaluate 15 open-weight models from eight families, with total parameters ranging from 4B to 1.60T. Every model has lower verbalized commitment for tool-return than user-message cues and for implicit than explicit cues. Unverbalized adoption is higher for tool-return cues on all 15 models and for implicit cues in 28 of 30 model-channel comparisons. A source-attribution prompt narrows the channel gap on seven models, sometimes by increasing user-channel unverbalized adoption, while telling models that their reasoning will be monitored does not reliably close the gap. We also use two transcript monitors (GPT-5.6-Luna and GPT-4o-mini) to detect preference adoption in the largest model of each family. Across 32 model-channel-explicitness cells, higher unverbalized adoption is associated with lower detection ability for both monitors (Pearson r=-0.54 and r=-0.78, respectively). These results suggest that CoT monitoring may be less reliable when preference information arrives through tools or must be inferred from raw artifacts, within the single-call, prefilled-tool setting tested here.