# Peer Oversight in Collective Decision Making

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.28754 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.28754/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 5 of its 25 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 28 Aug 2026.

## Builds on (most cited first, 5 of 5)

- [A Game-Theoretic Account of Responsibility Allocation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2105.09129/) (2021)
- [Blameworthiness in Security Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1910.08647/) (2019)
- [Responsibility Gap in Collective Decision Making](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.06312/) (2025)
- [Higher-Order Responsibility](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.01003/) (2025)
- [A Graph-Theoretical Perspective on Law Design for Multiagent Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2511.06361/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

This article introduces peer k-oversight, a property of sequential collective decision mechanisms requiring at least k agents to be responsible for every harmful outcome. It is shown that whenever k-oversight can be achieved by redistributing control over the decisions in a mechanism, it can be achieved using just k agents. A polynomial-time algorithm is also presented that determines whether such a redistribution exists and, when it does, constructs one. These results establish peer oversight as a tractable design principle for multiagent decision-making systems.