# Coverage Is Not Containment: A Fundamental Limit of Admission-Time Defenses Against Coordinated Poisoning of Vector Retrieval

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.16044 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.16044/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Privacy and security of RAG, one of 15 directions in Retrieval-augmented generation.
- Builds on 32 of its 41 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 17 Aug 2026.

## Placed in

- Retrieval-augmented generation / [Privacy and security of RAG](https://mlsanity.com/rag/privacy-and-security-of-rag/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 30 of 32)

- [Retrieval-Augmented Generation for Knowledge-Intensive NLP Tasks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2005.11401/) (2020)
- [Sentence-BERT: Sentence Embeddings using Siamese BERT-Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1908.10084/) (2019)
- [Dense Passage Retrieval for Open-Domain Question Answering](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2004.04906/) (2020)
- [Towards Evaluating the Robustness of Neural Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1608.04644/) (2016)
- [Billion-scale similarity search with GPUs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1702.08734/) (2017)
- [REALM: Retrieval-Augmented Language Model Pre-Training](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2002.08909/) (2020)
- [Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injection](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.12173/) (2023)
- [Text Embeddings by Weakly-Supervised Contrastive Pre-training](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2212.03533/) (2022)
- [BEIR: A Heterogenous Benchmark for Zero-shot Evaluation of Information Retrieval Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2104.08663/) (2021)
- [Unsupervised Dense Information Retrieval with Contrastive Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2112.09118/) (2021)
- [ColBERT: Efficient and Effective Passage Search via Contextualized Late Interaction over BERT](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2004.12832/) (2020)
- [Efficient and robust approximate nearest neighbor search using Hierarchical Navigable Small World graphs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1603.09320/) (2016)
- [How Contextual are Contextualized Word Representations? Comparing the Geometry of BERT, ELMo, and GPT-2 Embeddings](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1909.00512/) (2019)
- [Towards General Text Embeddings with Multi-stage Contrastive Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.03281/) (2023)
- [MTEB: Massive Text Embedding Benchmark](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2210.07316/) (2022)
- [On Adaptive Attacks to Adversarial Example Defenses](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2002.08347/) (2020)
- [Poison Frogs! Targeted Clean-Label Poisoning Attacks on Neural Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1804.00792/) (2018)
- [Certified Defenses for Data Poisoning Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1706.03691/) (2017)
- [PoisonedRAG: Knowledge Corruption Attacks to Retrieval-Augmented Generation of Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.07867/) (2024)
- [Representation Degeneration Problem in Training Natural Language Generation Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1907.12009/) (2019)
- [All-but-the-Top: Simple and Effective Postprocessing for Word Representations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1702.01417/) (2017)
- [Poisoning Retrieval Corpora by Injecting Adversarial Passages](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.19156/) (2023)
- [Certifiably Robust RAG against Retrieval Corruption](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.15556/) (2024)
- [RAB: Provable Robustness Against Backdoor Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2003.08904/) (2020)
- [Deep Partition Aggregation: Provable Defense against General Poisoning Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2006.14768/) (2020)
- [Certified Robustness to Label-Flipping Attacks via Randomized Smoothing](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2002.03018/) (2020)
- [Intrinsic Certified Robustness of Bagging against Data Poisoning Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2008.04495/) (2020)
- [BadRAG: Identifying Vulnerabilities in Retrieval Augmented Generation of Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.00083/) (2024)
- [Adversarial Semantic Collisions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2011.04743/) (2020)
- [Order-Disorder: Imitation Adversarial Attacks for Black-box Neural Ranking Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2209.06506/) (2022)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) answers a question by retrieving passages from a vector store and trusting them as context, so anyone who can add documents can try to steer the answer. A recent, appealing defense filters poisoning at ingestion, rejecting any document that behaves like a hub. We show it -- and every ingestion-time filter -- is defeated by a coordinated adversary that injects a handful of individually unremarkable documents which together surround one target query and seize its top-k (on BGE-large / BEIR, m=10 documents take 10/10; 9.9/10 on a live HNSW index). The attack is not theoretical. Realized as ordinary fluent text and run end-to-end through a BGE-large + HNSW + Qwen2.5-7B pipeline, it makes the generator emit the attacker's planted claim in 88% of targets, versus 0% without the injection. And no admission-time defense stops it: at ingestion an attack cone is geometrically identical to a legitimate niche upload, so -- measuring this directly -- the strongest trained classifier, given every feature and thousands of examples, separates the two no better than chance, catching 4.2% of attacks at a 1% false-positive rate. We prove this limit for the entire class of ingestion-time statistics (any decision from documents and reference queries alone), and it reproduces -- and worsens -- across two corpora and five encoders. The one signal that separates an attack from legitimate niche ingestion -- a query's demand -- is invisible before retrieval, which is also the escape: a retrieval-time detector that observes demand catches 100% of the attacks at the same 1% false-positive rate. Coverage of the query space by an admission gate is not containment of coordinated poisoning; robust defense must move past the front door, to demand.