# Detecting Money Laundering in Rwandan Mobile Money: A Machine Learning Framework

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.15447 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.15447/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 4 of its 24 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 15 Aug 2026.

## Builds on (most cited first, 4 of 4)

- [A Unified Approach to Interpreting Model Predictions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1705.07874/) (2017)
- [Deep Learning for Anomaly Detection: A Survey](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1901.03407/) (2019)
- [Anti-Money Laundering in Bitcoin: Experimenting with Graph Convolutional Networks for Financial Forensics](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1908.02591/) (2019)
- [Realistic Synthetic Financial Transactions for Anti-Money Laundering Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.16424/) (2023)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Mobile money has widened financial access across Sub-Saharan Africa and enlarged the surface for money-laundering and terrorism-financing (ML/TF) activity in ecosystems dominated by high-volume, low-value transactions. Rwanda is a case in point: several million active mobile-money users, telecom-led wallets on the MTN and Airtel networks, and a Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) supervising transaction streams whose scale exceeds static rule-based monitoring. This paper develops and evaluates a transaction-monitoring framework aligned to the Rwandan AML/CFT regime under (i) extreme class imbalance (~0.1% prevalence), (ii) scarce and delayed labels, and (iii) bounded investigator capacity. Using SAML-D, a synthetic dataset of 9,504,852 transactions with 17 laundering typologies, we engineer account-centric behavioural features (rolling velocity, net-flow directionality, counterparty diversity, burstiness) and benchmark supervised classifiers (Logistic Regression, Random Forest, LightGBM), unsupervised anomaly detectors (Isolation Forest, Local Outlier Factor), a dense autoencoder, and a late-fusion meta-learner. Evaluation is operational: PR-AUC, recall at a calibrated ~90%-precision point, recall at top-K%, and alerts per 10,000. On the chronologically held-out test period, LightGBM attains PR-AUC = 0.0469, capturing 64 laundering cases at precision ~0.89 with 0.51 alerts per 10,000; the fusion stacker reaches PR-AUC = 0.0477 at precision ~0.91 and 0.46 alerts per 10,000, recovering 59 true positives. We map score bands to Rwanda-relevant analyst workflows and STR/SAR escalation, and outline a staged path from synthetic prototyping to real-data validation with the National Bank of Rwanda and FIC. The contribution is operational: a governance-aware pipeline and evaluation protocol calibrated to the constraints of an African mobile-money regulator, not a new algorithm.