# Position: Evaluations of AI Moral Reasoning Still Miss Half of the Picture

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.14566 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.14566/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Reasoning benchmarks and evaluation, one of 17 directions in LLM reasoning.
- Builds on 11 of its 16 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 29 May 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM reasoning / [Reasoning benchmarks and evaluation](https://mlsanity.com/lr/reasoning-benchmarks-and-evaluation/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 11 of 11)

- [Aligning AI With Shared Human Values](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2008.02275/) (2020)
- [Ethical Reasoning over Moral Alignment: A Case and Framework for In-Context Ethical Policies in LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.07251/) (2023)
- [Are Large Language Models Consistent over Value-laden Questions?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.02996/) (2024)
- [Rethinking Machine Ethics -- Can LLMs Perform Moral Reasoning through the Lens of Moral Theories?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.15399/) (2023)
- [MoReBench: Evaluating Procedural and Pluralistic Moral Reasoning in Language Models, More than Outcomes](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.16380/) (2025)
- [Are Large Language Models Moral Hypocrites? A Study Based on Moral Foundations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.11100/) (2024)
- [Generative Value Conflicts Reveal LLM Priorities](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.25369/) (2025)
- [Are Language Models Consequentialist or Deontological Moral Reasoners?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.21479/) (2025)
- [FRIT: Using Causal Importance to Improve Chain-of-Thought Faithfulness](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.13334/) (2025)
- [The Pluralistic Moral Gap: Understanding Judgment and Value Differences between Humans and Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.17216/) (2025)
- [Moral Change or Noise? On Problems of Aligning AI With Temporally Unstable Human Feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2511.10032/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Recent work on evaluating the moral competence of large language models (LLMs) has focused primarily on what we call the moral value problem, i.e., whether model outputs align with human moral values. In contrast, the moral norm problem, i.e., whether models can identify and correctly apply context-sensitive moral norms, remains underexplored. We posit that this imbalance stems from the field's reliance on descriptive ethics frameworks, such as Moral Foundations Theory and Kohlberg's stages of moral development, which emphasize value representation over normative application. We review existing benchmarks and evaluation methods, and show that they cluster heavily around the value problem, while discussion regarding normative ethics remains underrepresented. We identify three crucial gaps: (i) the absence of high-quality ground-truth data for moral norms and their applications, (ii) insufficient evaluation of intermediate reasoning processes, and (iii) limited attention to the identification of morally relevant features in context. Subsequently, we propose a research agenda that includes the development of standardized formal representations for normative theories, the construction of expert-annotated datasets capturing norm application, and evaluation protocols that explicitly distinguish between values-level and norms-level competence. Our goal is to encourage a more systematic study of normative reasoning in LLMs.