# HiRoute: Hierarchical Routed Prompt Tuning for Safety Alignment of Large Language Models

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.12821 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.12821/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Safety alignment and jailbreak attacks, one of 10 directions in LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation.
- Builds on 13 of its 20 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 13 Aug 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation / [Safety alignment and jailbreak attacks](https://mlsanity.com/alignment/safety-alignment-and-jailbreak-attacks/)
- LLM safety and security / [Safety alignment, refusal and guardrails](https://mlsanity.com/safety/safety-alignment-refusal-and-guardrails/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 13 of 13)

- [Training language models to follow instructions with human feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.02155/) (2022)
- [Training Verifiers to Solve Math Word Problems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2110.14168/) (2021)
- [Judging LLM-as-a-Judge with MT-Bench and Chatbot Arena](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.05685/) (2023)
- [Direct Preference Optimization: Your Language Model is Secretly a Reward Model](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.18290/) (2023)
- [The Power of Scale for Parameter-Efficient Prompt Tuning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2104.08691/) (2021)
- [Finetuned Language Models Are Zero-Shot Learners](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2109.01652/) (2021)
- [Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.15043/) (2023)
- [Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2212.08073/) (2022)
- [Safety-Tuned LLaMAs: Lessons From Improving the Safety of Large Language Models that Follow Instructions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.07875/) (2023)
- [Oyster-I: Beyond Refusal -- Constructive Safety Alignment for Responsible Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.01909/) (2025)
- [Safety Alignment of Large Language Models via Contrasting Safe and Harmful Distributions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.16743/) (2024)
- [Efficiency vs. Alignment: Investigating Safety and Fairness Risks in Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning of LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2511.00382/) (2025)
- [MOSAIC: Composable Safety Alignment with Modular Control Tokens](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.16210/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to harmful requests and jailbreak attacks. Parameter-efficient safety alignment methods based on prompt tuning typically rely on a single global prompt or externally selected prompt modules. Such static designs struggle to maintain a cross-category safety boundary while generating constructive responses tailored to specific risks and avoiding over-refusal of benign inputs. To address these limitations, we propose HiRoute, an input-adaptive hierarchical prompt-tuning framework that separates category-agnostic safety control from category-specific response guidance. HiRoute first trains a lightweight hierarchical router on representations extracted from a frozen LLM to jointly detect harmful intent and predict multi-label risk scores. It then freezes both the backbone model and the router and uses preference optimization with alternating gradient updates to learn a shared coarse-grained prompt and a set of fine-grained prompt experts as continuous embeddings. At inference time, benign inputs bypass the safety branch, whereas risky inputs are processed using the shared prompt together with a router-weighted mixture of risk-specific prompt experts. Experiments across three instruction-tuned models show that HiRoute achieves high safety rates across multiple safety benchmarks while preserving safe-response helpfulness, reducing over-refusal, and maintaining competitive performance on general-purpose tasks.