# The Politician, the Liar, and the Obedient Worker: Emerging Behavior of LLM Agents in Hierarchical Games

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.09574 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.09574/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Social simulation and multi-agent debate, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use.
- Builds on 12 of its 35 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 10 Aug 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM agents and tool use / [Social simulation and multi-agent debate](https://mlsanity.com/agents/social-simulation-and-multi-agent-debate/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 12 of 12)

- [Generative Agents: Interactive Simulacra of Human Behavior](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.03442/) (2023)
- [AutoGen: Enabling Next-Gen LLM Applications via Multi-Agent Conversation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.08155/) (2023)
- [Out of One, Many: Using Language Models to Simulate Human Samples](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2209.06899/) (2022)
- [AgentVerse: Facilitating Multi-Agent Collaboration and Exploring Emergent Behaviors](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.10848/) (2023)
- [Using Large Language Models to Simulate Multiple Humans and Replicate Human Subject Studies](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2208.10264/) (2022)
- [Large Language Models can Strategically Deceive their Users when Put Under Pressure](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.07590/) (2023)
- [Cooperate or Collapse: Emergence of Sustainable Cooperation in a Society of LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.16698/) (2024)
- [Strategic Behavior of Large Language Models: Game Structure vs. Contextual Framing](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.05898/) (2023)
- [Hoodwinked: Deception and Cooperation in a Text-Based Game for Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.01404/) (2023)
- [LLM economicus? Mapping the Behavioral Biases of LLMs via Utility Theory](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2408.02784/) (2024)
- [Understanding LLM Agent Behaviours via Game Theory: Strategy Recognition, Biases and Multi-Agent Dynamics](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2512.07462/) (2025)
- [When Do Large Language Models Exhibit Unsolicited Deception?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.00285/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

LLMs are rapidly embedding themselves into daily life: drafting our emails, managing our schedules, and making decisions on our behalf. As they move from individual tools to participants in multi-agent organizations, an important question arises: do they reproduce the governance failures like free-riding, corruption, and entrenched leadership that plague human institutions? We introduce the Hierarchical Game (HG), a public goods game extended with managerial authority, democratic elections, and private communication. Testing six frontier models across twelve experiments that add institutions one at a time (speech, peers, government, wages, oversight, elections), we find distinct behavioral profiles: Qwen promises and lies (13.3% broken promises); Grok refuses to cooperate on its own but becomes fully cooperative once a manager can punish it (16%→100%); Claude and GPT-4o cooperate reliably at baseline. But honesty proves fragile. When the manager role comes with a salary, all models except GPT-4o start cutting private deals to win or keep the position. When punishment is made anonymous, honest models begin to cheat. When all agents share the same model family, the first elected manager stays in power indefinitely. Leadership change only happens in groups that mix different families.
