# Language Models Encode the Contextual Truth of Propositions

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.03035 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.03035/

## Key facts

- Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 22 of its 27 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 4 Aug 2026.

## Builds on (most cited first, 22 of 22)

- [LLaMA: Open and Efficient Foundation Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.13971/) (2023)
- [A large annotated corpus for learning natural language inference](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1508.05326/) (2015)
- [Understanding intermediate layers using linear classifier probes](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1610.01644/) (2016)
- [Inference-Time Intervention: Eliciting Truthful Answers from a Language Model](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.03341/) (2023)
- [Steering Llama 2 via Contrastive Activation Addition](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.06681/) (2023)
- [Towards Understanding Sycophancy in Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.13548/) (2023)
- [Discovering Language Model Behaviors with Model-Written Evaluations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2212.09251/) (2022)
- [Discovering Latent Knowledge in Language Models Without Supervision](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2212.03827/) (2022)
- [The Geometry of Truth: Emergent Linear Structure in Large Language Model Representations of True/False Datasets](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.06824/) (2023)
- [The Internal State of an LLM Knows When It's Lying](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.13734/) (2023)
- [WildChat: 1M ChatGPT Interaction Logs in the Wild](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.01470/) (2024)
- [Hypothesis Only Baselines in Natural Language Inference](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1805.01042/) (2018)
- [LLMs Know More Than They Show: On the Intrinsic Representation of LLM Hallucinations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.02707/) (2024)
- [How to Catch an AI Liar: Lie Detection in Black-Box LLMs by Asking Unrelated Questions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.15840/) (2023)
- [Truth is Universal: Robust Detection of Lies in LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.12831/) (2024)
- [Still No Lie Detector for Language Models: Probing Empirical and Conceptual Roadblocks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.00175/) (2023)
- [Do Androids Know They're Only Dreaming of Electric Sheep?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.17249/) (2023)
- [Explore Theory of Mind: Program-guided adversarial data generation for theory of mind reasoning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2412.12175/) (2024)
- [Probing the Geometry of Truth: Consistency and Generalization of Truth Directions in LLMs Across Logical Transformations and Question Answering Tasks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.00823/) (2025)
- [Cancer-Myth: Evaluating Large Language Models on Patient Questions with False Presuppositions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.11373/) (2025)
- [Representation Without Control: Testing the Realization Effect in Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.25151/) (2026)
- [Sycophancy Undermines Epistemic Vigilance in Cooperative Vision-Language Tasks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2607.29585/) (2026)

## Built on by (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [Toward a Graded Measure of Belief Stability in Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.34158/) (2026)
- [Anatomy of LLM Sycophancy: What a Flip Rate Hides](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.06522/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Prior work has shown that LLMs encode the truth of factual propositions along linear directions in activation space. It's unclear how these representations extend to contextual truth: propositions whose truth is determined by in-context evidence rather than world knowledge. We show that LLMs maintain a linear representation of contextual truth that persists across structurally different output policies, even when the output doesn't require the model to determine a proposition's truth, and show causal evidence via steering experiments. Using the transcripts from a collaborative vision-language task that requires two LLMs to maintain a shared common ground, we show that truth representations of a proposition are significantly swayed by partner assertions about that proposition, even when the LLM has enough evidence to determine its truth. We find evidence that propositions near the decision boundary are more susceptible to having their truth shifted through partner assertions. Separating representation from output distinguish two forms of sycophancy that output behavior alone cannot: the model may accommodate a false proposition while continuing to represent it as false, or shift its representation across the boundary. The latter is 2.59x more common when the model agrees by restating the false claim explicitly than when it agrees implicitly.