# MemSecBench: Tracking Agent Memory Poisoning from Persistence to Consequence and Repair

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.27080 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2607.27080/

## Key facts

- Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use.
- Builds on 16 of its 20 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 29 Jul 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM agents and tool use / [Agent threats, guardrails and governance](https://mlsanity.com/agents/agent-threats-guardrails-and-governance/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 16 of 16)

- [Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injection](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.12173/) (2023)
- [A-MEM: Agentic Memory for LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.12110/) (2025)
- [Evaluating Very Long-Term Conversational Memory of LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.17753/) (2024)
- [LongMemEval: Benchmarking Chat Assistants on Long-Term Interactive Memory](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.10813/) (2024)
- [AgentPoison: Red-teaming LLM Agents via Poisoning Memory or Knowledge Bases](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.12784/) (2024)
- [Evaluating Memory in LLM Agents via Incremental Multi-Turn Interactions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.05257/) (2025)
- [Memory Injection Attacks on LLM Agents via Query-Only Interaction](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.03704/) (2025)
- [From Untrusted Input to Trusted Memory: A Systematic Study of Memory Poisoning Attacks in LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.04329/) (2026)
- [A Survey on Long-Term Memory Security in LLM Agents: Attacks, Defenses, and Governance Across the Memory Lifecycle](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.16548/) (2026)
- [Hidden in Memory: Sleeper Memory Poisoning in LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.15338/) (2026)
- [Poison Once, Exploit Forever: Environment-Injected Memory Poisoning Attacks on Web Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.02623/) (2026)
- [From Storage to Steering: Memory Control Flow Attacks on LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.15125/) (2026)
- [Securing LLM-Agent Long-Term Memory Against Poisoning: Non-Malleable, Origin-Bound Authority with Machine-Checked Guarantees](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.24322/) (2026)
- [Trojan Hippo: Weaponizing Agent Memory for Data Exfiltration](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.01970/) (2026)
- [MemMorph: Tool Hijacking in LLM Agents via Memory Poisoning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.26154/) (2026)
- [MemLeak: Diagnosing Information Leaks in Multimodal Agent Memory](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.29788/) (2026)

## Built on by (most cited first, 4 of 4)

- [CoSec: Benchmarking Agent Security in Communities](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.34790/) (2026)
- [Audience-Bound Persistent Memory: Authorization Across the Memory Lifecycle](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.36373/) (2026)
- [When Evidence Changes: Evaluating Memory Repair and Re-reading in Language-Model Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.03902/) (2026)
- [MemForm: Benchmarking Memory Formation Poisoning in LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.14431/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Memory systems allow agents to retain and reuse information from past interactions, but they can also let malicious content persist. A malicious instruction crafted by an attacker may be stored in long-term memory, recalled much later, and quietly shape a real action. Recent benchmarks increasingly examine agent memory security, yet few trace the same malicious semantics across persistence, downstream consequences, and selective repair under diverse memory-backend comparisons. To address this gap, we introduce MemSecBench, a task-grounded benchmark for the lifecycle security of agent memory systems. It contains 310 cases drawn from 48 realistic contexts across code and science, daily life, and office work. Each case follows a controlled Write--Execute--Forget protocol in an isolated runtime under an exact agent configuration, defined by an agent harness, a memory backend, and an LLM backend. Evidence-based adjudication combines a deterministic write check, checkpoint-specific judge-model evaluations, and programmatic gates across seven lifecycle checkpoints. The experimental design spans a 24-configuration matrix of two agent harnesses, four memory backends, and three LLM backends. Across all 24 configurations, malicious memory persists in 84.2% of all cases, and the full Write--Execute chain succeeds in 50.3%. Among successfully poisoned cases, 59.6% complete the full Execute chain, while 56.1% achieve selective repair.Compared with matched Native configurations, the largest absolute differences are 16.1 percentage points for end-to-end attack success and 41.3 percentage points for selective repair. These descriptive contrasts indicate that the evaluated memory system stacks differ in lifecycle security, both in the propagation of malicious memory and in selective repair after successful memory poisoning.