# False Prophets: On the Security of World Models in Agentic Systems

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.23147 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2607.23147/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in World model security and GUI agents, one of 11 directions in World models.
- Builds on 0 of its 38 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 25 Jul 2026.

## Placed in

- World models / [World model security and GUI agents](https://mlsanity.com/wm/world-model-security-and-gui-agents/)
- LLM agents and tool use / [Agent threats, guardrails and governance](https://mlsanity.com/agents/agent-threats-guardrails-and-governance/)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Large language models now power autonomous agents capable of complex, multi-step tasks in different environments. Accurate and reliable execution of these tasks requires the agent to predict the results of its actions. Recent research proposes to enhance predictive capabilities via specially trained environment simulators-world models. While world models can improve performance, they can also mislead agents into executing harmful actions, creating significant security and privacy risks. In this paper, we raise security concerns regarding the usage of world models in agentic systems. We discover a range of world model specific vulnerabilities, which can be exploited in terminal-based agents to execute malicious code or extract sensitive data. To facilitate future development, we introduce a security benchmark dataset designed for text-based world models. We argue that some risks are intrinsic to approximate world modeling, and show that attackers can induce mispredictions in agentic pipelines with up to 95% success rate, possibly resulting in unintended command execution, denial of service, drainage of wallet and private information extraction. Finally, we provide practical recommendations for practitioners to mitigate the discovered harms and harden agentic systems.