# Draining the Energy Commons: Self-Defeating Over-Appropriation as a Coordination Failure in Agentic LLM Collectives

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.22188 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2607.22188/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Social simulation and multi-agent debate, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use.
- Builds on 33 of its 71 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 24 Jul 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM agents and tool use / [Social simulation and multi-agent debate](https://mlsanity.com/agents/social-simulation-and-multi-agent-debate/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 30 of 33)

- [Training language models to follow instructions with human feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.02155/) (2022)
- [Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2212.08073/) (2022)
- [Concrete Problems in AI Safety](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1606.06565/) (2016)
- [AI and the Everything in the Whole Wide World Benchmark](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2111.15366/) (2021)
- [The Effects of Reward Misspecification: Mapping and Mitigating Misaligned Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2201.03544/) (2022)
- [Measurement and Fairness](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1912.05511/) (2019)
- [A Unified Game-Theoretic Approach to Multiagent Reinforcement Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1711.00832/) (2017)
- [The Alignment Problem from a Deep Learning Perspective](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2209.00626/) (2022)
- [Playing repeated games with Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.16867/) (2023)
- [Open Problems in Cooperative AI](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2012.08630/) (2020)
- [Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.14143/) (2025)
- [Goal Misgeneralization: Why Correct Specifications Aren't Enough For Correct Goals](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2210.01790/) (2022)
- [Cooperate or Collapse: Emergence of Sustainable Cooperation in a Society of LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.16698/) (2024)
- [Goal Misgeneralization in Deep Reinforcement Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2105.14111/) (2021)
- [AI Safety Gridworlds](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1711.09883/) (2017)
- [Scalable Evaluation of Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning with Melting Pot](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2107.06857/) (2021)
- [A multi-agent reinforcement learning model of common-pool resource appropriation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1707.06600/) (2017)
- [Algorithmic Collusion by Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.00806/) (2024)
- [Strategic Behavior of Large Language Models: Game Structure vs. Contextual Framing](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.05898/) (2023)
- [Rethinking the Discount Factor in Reinforcement Learning: A Decision Theoretic Approach](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1902.02893/) (2019)
- [Characterizing AI Agents for Alignment and Governance](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.21848/) (2025)
- [Strategic Collusion of LLM Agents: Market Division in Multi-Commodity Competitions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.00031/) (2024)
- [Corrupted by Reasoning: Reasoning Language Models Become Free-Riders in Public Goods Games](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.23276/) (2025)
- [Institutional AI: Governing LLM Collusion in Multi-Agent Cournot Markets via Public Governance Graphs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.11369/) (2026)
- [MONA: Myopic Optimization with Non-myopic Approval Can Mitigate Multi-step Reward Hacking](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2501.13011/) (2025)
- [CoopEval: Benchmarking Cooperation-Sustaining Mechanisms and LLM Agents in Social Dilemmas](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.15267/) (2026)
- [Empirical Game-Theoretic Analysis: A Survey](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.04018/) (2024)
- [Towards the Scalable Evaluation of Cooperativeness in Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.13360/) (2023)
- [Beyond Single-Agent Safety: A Taxonomy of Risks in LLM-to-LLM Interactions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2512.02682/) (2025)
- [The Role of Social Learning and Collective Norm Formation in Fostering Cooperation in LLM Multi-Agent Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.14401/) (2025)

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Xeno-Interpretability: Investigating the Alien Minds of LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.20408/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

LLMs are increasingly deployed as agents that plan, use tools, and act over time. When they share persistent resources, such as compute pools or energy reserves, decisions by one agent affect the conditions faced by later agents. We study this coordination failure in a renewable energy commons. Four same-family GPT, Gemini, or Grok agents act in homogeneous self-play as electricity prosumers, instructed to maximize operational continuity. Holding aggregate residual demand and the decision protocol fixed, we vary the regeneration rate of a shared energy reserve from abundance to scarcity. All three families preserve the reserve when demand does not exceed peak renewable replacement, but over-appropriate it beyond that threshold (all nine exact scarcity contrasts survive Holm correction; largest adjusted p = 4.87e-5). The pattern is self-defeating: the same populations protect current service while undermining future service. At higher scarcity (rho = 1.2), early aggregate request pressure exceeds peak renewable replacement in every family and averages 1.21 times that level. Mean trajectories fall below the reserve level of maximum replenishment by rounds 5-7. Two offline benchmarks compare a social planner maximizing group-wide operational-service value with open access, where each prosumer maximizes its own value. At a discount factor of gamma = 0.95, both benchmarks sustain the reserve under the same dynamics. Realized depletion instead resembles outcomes under a more impatient open-access benchmark. The populations therefore behave like impatient optimizers at the level of the public trajectory. This system-level alignment failure would be missed by isolated-response evaluation.