# Co-design of LLM-based preference agents: participation may drive overtrust

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.21757 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2607.21757/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Social simulation and multi-agent debate, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use.
- Builds on 17 of its 40 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 23 Jul 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM agents and tool use / [Social simulation and multi-agent debate](https://mlsanity.com/agents/social-simulation-and-multi-agent-debate/)
- LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation / [Human values and AI feedback alignment](https://mlsanity.com/alignment/human-values-and-ai-feedback-alignment/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 17 of 17)

- [Whose Opinions Do Language Models Reflect?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.17548/) (2023)
- [Out of One, Many: Using Language Models to Simulate Human Samples](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2209.06899/) (2022)
- [Scalable agent alignment via reward modeling: a research direction](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1811.07871/) (2018)
- [Towards Measuring the Representation of Subjective Global Opinions in Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.16388/) (2023)
- [Personalizing Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback with Variational Preference Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2408.10075/) (2024)
- [Large language models that replace human participants can harmfully misportray and flatten identity groups](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.01908/) (2024)
- [Artificial Hivemind: The Open-Ended Homogeneity of Language Models (and Beyond)](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.22954/) (2025)
- [Participation is not a Design Fix for Machine Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2007.02423/) (2020)
- [Picking on the Same Person: Does Algorithmic Monoculture lead to Outcome Homogenization?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2211.13972/) (2022)
- [Random Silicon Sampling: Simulating Human Sub-Population Opinion Using a Large Language Model Based on Group-Level Demographic Information](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.18144/) (2024)
- [Beyond Preferences in AI Alignment](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2408.16984/) (2024)
- [Agentic AI: A Comprehensive Survey of Architectures, Applications, and Future Directions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.25445/) (2025)
- [AI Alignment with Changing and Influenceable Reward Functions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.17713/) (2024)
- [From 1,000,000 Users to Every User: Scaling Up Personalized Preference for User-level Alignment](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.15463/) (2025)
- [From Agent-Only Social Networks to Autonomous Scientific Research: Lessons from OpenClaw and Moltbook, and the Architecture of ClawdLab and Beach.Science](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.19810/) (2026)
- [The Chameleon's Limit: Investigating Persona Collapse and Homogenization in Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.24698/) (2026)
- [The Impostor is Among Us: Can Large Language Models Capture the Complexity of Human Personas?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2501.04543/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Large language models are increasingly used to simulate human preferences in research and practical applications, raising concerns about validation, misrepresentation, and exclusion. Co-designing agents with the people they represent is a promising way to address these concerns, but participation may also mask the problems it appears to solve. This paper explores that tension through a primarily qualitative study in which 12 participants co-designed personal preference agents in the domain of household energy, via a background survey, co-design interview, and validation survey. Participants engaged readily and mostly came to see their agents as representing them well. Independent validation, however, revealed mixed human-agent alignment, with agent responses markedly more homogeneous, decisive, and abstract than the human sample. I argue that participation and process transparency can act as an "overtrust engine" that promotes trust while concealing systematic misalignment with potential structural consequences at scale. I develop this as a core mechanism in participatory preference agent design, treating individual alignment not as a fixed state but as an enacted process.