# Auditing Provenance Sensitivity in LLM Agent Action Selection

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.20827 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2607.20827/

## Key facts

- Cited by 12 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use.
- Builds on 24 of its 31 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 23 Jul 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM agents and tool use / [Agent threats, guardrails and governance](https://mlsanity.com/agents/agent-threats-guardrails-and-governance/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 24 of 24)

- [ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2210.03629/) (2022)
- [Judging LLM-as-a-Judge with MT-Bench and Chatbot Arena](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.05685/) (2023)
- [Toolformer: Language Models Can Teach Themselves to Use Tools](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.04761/) (2023)
- [Axiomatic Attribution for Deep Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1703.01365/) (2017)
- [WebArena: A Realistic Web Environment for Building Autonomous Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.13854/) (2023)
- [ToolLLM: Facilitating Large Language Models to Master 16000+ Real-world APIs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.16789/) (2023)
- [Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injection](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.12173/) (2023)
- [τ-bench: A Benchmark for Tool-Agent-User Interaction in Real-World Domains](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.12045/) (2024)
- [Gorilla: Large Language Model Connected with Massive APIs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.15334/) (2023)
- [OSWorld: Benchmarking Multimodal Agents for Open-Ended Tasks in Real Computer Environments](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.07972/) (2024)
- [A-MEM: Agentic Memory for LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.12110/) (2025)
- [τ2-Bench: Evaluating Conversational Agents in a Dual-Control Environment](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.07982/) (2025)
- [The Instruction Hierarchy: Training LLMs to Prioritize Privileged Instructions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.13208/) (2024)
- [WorkArena: How Capable Are Web Agents at Solving Common Knowledge Work Tasks?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.07718/) (2024)
- [Defeating Prompt Injections by Design](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.18813/) (2025)
- [ToolSandbox: A Stateful, Conversational, Interactive Evaluation Benchmark for LLM Tool Use Capabilities](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2408.04682/) (2024)
- [The Task Shield: Enforcing Task Alignment to Defend Against Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2412.16682/) (2024)
- [ACEBench: Who Wins the Match Point in Tool Usage?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2501.12851/) (2025)
- [AttriGuard: Defeating Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents via Causal Attribution of Tool Invocations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.10749/) (2026)
- [ClawGuard: A Runtime Security Framework for Tool-Augmented LLM Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.11790/) (2026)
- [CausalArmor: Efficient Indirect Prompt Injection Guardrails via Causal Attribution](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.07918/) (2026)
- [Rethinking Stateful Tool Use in Multi-Turn Dialogues: Benchmarks and Challenges](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.13328/) (2025)
- [AgentSys: Secure and Dynamic LLM Agents Through Explicit Hierarchical Memory Management](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.07398/) (2026)
- [Evaluating the Correctness of Inference Patterns Used by LLMs for Judgment](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.09083/) (2024)

## Built on by (most cited first, 12 of 12)

- [When Stale Constraints Go Unchecked: Budgeted Verification Failures in Inherited Agent Memory](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.25553/) (2026)
- [Correct Is Not Governed: Provenance Integrity in Agentic Workflows](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.12761/) (2026)
- [ResidualAuth: What Authorization State Must Language Agents Preserve under Revocable Delegation?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.08062/) (2026)
- [Influence Is Not Authority: When Causal Guardrail Signals Make Legitimate Tool Use Look Like an Attack in Tool-Using LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.29942/) (2026)
- [HANSARD: A Reference Architecture for Forensic Readiness, Runtime Witnessing, and Graded Attribution in Autonomous Multi-Agent AI Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.22512/) (2026)
- [Causal Attribution for Agentic Decisions: Estimators, Coupling, and a Traceability Specification](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.06445/) (2026)
- [Do AI Coding Assistants Check Before They Install? A Pre-Registered Demand-Side Audit of Trust Signals in the Research Software Supply Chain](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.07754/) (2026)
- [Record Grouping Controls Evidence Weight in Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.08698/) (2026)
- [Same Winners, Different Success Rates: Evaluating How LLM Agents Recover from Failures](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.34215/) (2026)
- [Blocking at the Boundary: Auditing Long-Horizon Agents against Staged Prompt Injection](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.05163/) (2026)
- [Copies or Sources? Measuring How LLM Aggregators Count Restated Evidence in Multi-Agent Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.06192/) (2026)
- [Prior or Feedback? What an LLM Uses When Adapting Neural Operators](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.12325/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

LLM agents choose tools and arguments from context that mixes user requests, tool outputs, retrieved records, memory, and untrusted text. Evidence can be relevant without being authorized to determine a decision, so a correct action need not be grounded only in permitted evidence. We introduce a target-specific authorization audit that labels context factors separately for each tool and argument target. Its primary test holds the task, proposition, position, and policy fixed while changing only the proposition's source authority. We then test behavior when valid evidence is weakened and use context-subset interactions as a secondary localization diagnostic. Across 450 controlled next-action tasks and multiple open-weight LLM families, trusted and untrusted variants produce different actions in 5.4 percent of competing cases versus 1.7 percent of supporting cases. Under controlled degradation, unauthorized competition is retained in a full-correct, mixed-error, clean-correct pattern in 2.4 percent of comparisons, with a 95 percent confidence interval from 2.1 to 3.0 percent. These are controlled stress-set rates, not deployment prevalence. The models respond to textual source-authority cues, but this does not prevent untrusted evidence from influencing their actions.