# The Chronos Vulnerability: A Taxonomy of Temporal Persistence and Memory-Based Deception in Agentic AI

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.19433 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2607.19433/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use.
- Builds on 19 of its 26 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 20 Jul 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM agents and tool use / [Agent threats, guardrails and governance](https://mlsanity.com/agents/agent-threats-guardrails-and-governance/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 19 of 19)

- [ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2210.03629/) (2022)
- [Toolformer: Language Models Can Teach Themselves to Use Tools](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.04761/) (2023)
- [Generative Agents: Interactive Simulacra of Human Behavior](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.03442/) (2023)
- [Voyager: An Open-Ended Embodied Agent with Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.16291/) (2023)
- [ToolLLM: Facilitating Large Language Models to Master 16000+ Real-world APIs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.16789/) (2023)
- [Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injection](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.12173/) (2023)
- [MemGPT: Towards LLMs as Operating Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.08560/) (2023)
- [AgentBench: Evaluating LLMs as Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.03688/) (2023)
- [Mind2Web: Towards a Generalist Agent for the Web](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.06070/) (2023)
- [Sleeper Agents: Training Deceptive LLMs that Persist Through Safety Training](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2401.05566/) (2024)
- [AgentPoison: Red-teaming LLM Agents via Poisoning Memory or Knowledge Bases](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.12784/) (2024)
- [AgentSpec: Customizable Runtime Enforcement for Safe and Reliable LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.18666/) (2025)
- [Flow-of-Action: SOP Enhanced LLM-Based Multi-Agent System for Root Cause Analysis](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.08224/) (2025)
- [Enforcing Temporal Constraints for LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2512.23738/) (2025)
- [EchoLeak: The First Real-World Zero-Click Prompt Injection Exploit in a Production LLM System](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.10540/) (2025)
- [Confidential LLM Inference: Performance and Cost Across CPU and GPU TEEs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.18886/) (2025)
- [PAL*M: Property Attestation for Large Generative Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.16199/) (2026)
- [Many-to-One Adversarial Consensus: Exposing Multi-Agent Collusion Risks in AI-Based Healthcare](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2512.03097/) (2025)
- [MemTrust: A Zero-Trust Architecture for Unified AI Memory System](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.07004/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

The transition from stateless generative models in artificial intelligence to stateful, autonomous agents represents an architectural evolution that, while providing the capabilities of long-term planning and the automation of enterprise workflows, also represents the introduction of a new form of security threat, the Chronos Vulnerability. The Chronos Vulnerability represents the threat of memory-based attacks, including the Memory Injection Attack (MINJA) and the sleeper agent, in which the internal belief system of the autonomous agent is compromised, effectively decoupling the attack vector from the final catastrophic event. This study formalizes the threat model for persistence-based attacks and the threat of Dynamics Blindness in the context of the World of Workflows benchmark, demonstrating that traditional endpoint content filters are insufficient for the current stateful architecture. Consequently, this study synthesizes a defense-in-depth landscape, categorizing emerging frameworks such as diagnostic trajectory guardrails (AgentDoG), formal temporal verification (Agent-C), immunological memory consensus (A-MemGuard), and hardware-anchored trust via GPU-based Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) and Zero-Trust memory architectures.