# ChainMark: Model-Free LLM Watermarking with Closed-Form Calibration

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.18445 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2607.18445/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Watermarking generated content and models, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security.
- Builds on 9 of its 19 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 20 Jul 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM safety and security / [Watermarking generated content and models](https://mlsanity.com/safety/watermarking-generated-content-and-models/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 9 of 9)

- [No Language Left Behind: Scaling Human-Centered Machine Translation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2207.04672/) (2022)
- [DetectGPT: Zero-Shot Machine-Generated Text Detection using Probability Curvature](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2301.11305/) (2023)
- [A Watermark for Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2301.10226/) (2023)
- [Paraphrasing evades detectors of AI-generated text, but retrieval is an effective defense](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.13408/) (2023)
- [Can AI-Generated Text be Reliably Detected?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.11156/) (2023)
- [Robust Distortion-free Watermarks for Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.15593/) (2023)
- [Undetectable Watermarks for Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.09194/) (2023)
- [Who Wrote this Code? Watermarking for Code Generation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.15060/) (2023)
- [An Entropy-based Text Watermarking Detection Method](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.13485/) (2024)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Regulatory regimes such as the EU AI Act mandate machine-readable marking of synthetic text, but existing watermark detectors rely on the generating LM and on heuristic thresholds with no closed-form calibration. We introduce ChainMark, an active watermark that partitions the vocabulary into S states via keyed SHA-256 and forces a hard Markov transition on a fraction rho of positions; the detector replays the partition from the same key in O(n) hash operations, with no LM access. We derive a closed-form S*(n, rho, alpha) mapping a target FPR, text length, and budget to the minimum state count (Theorem 1), prove a universal robustness threshold delta* = 1 - 1/sqrt(2) approximately 29.3% that is invariant in (S, rho, n) (Theorem 2), and generalise both to any k-regular transition topology (Theorem 3). Across three instruction-tuned LLMs and four domains, ChainMark strictly dominates KGW and SWEET under translation and random-substitution attacks at matched budget; a one-corpus empirical recalibration restores the 1% target FPR on natural-language text.