# Dynamic Defense Profiling Enables Cognitive Jailbreak of Text-to-Image Models

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.17779 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2607.17779/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Vision-language and text-to-image safety, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security.
- Builds on 19 of its 35 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 20 Jul 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM safety and security / [Vision-language and text-to-image safety](https://mlsanity.com/safety/vision-language-and-text-to-image-safety/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 19 of 19)

- [Training language models to follow instructions with human feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.02155/) (2022)
- [SDXL: Improving Latent Diffusion Models for High-Resolution Image Synthesis](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.01952/) (2023)
- [Safe Latent Diffusion: Mitigating Inappropriate Degeneration in Diffusion Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2211.05105/) (2022)
- [Red-Teaming the Stable Diffusion Safety Filter](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2210.04610/) (2022)
- [Ring-A-Bell! How Reliable are Concept Removal Methods for Diffusion Models?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.10012/) (2023)
- [MMA-Diffusion: MultiModal Attack on Diffusion Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.17516/) (2023)
- [SneakyPrompt: Jailbreaking Text-to-image Generative Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.12082/) (2023)
- [Prompting4Debugging: Red-Teaming Text-to-Image Diffusion Models by Finding Problematic Prompts](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.06135/) (2023)
- [Can Machines Help Us Answering Question 16 in Datasheets, and In Turn Reflecting on Inappropriate Content?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2202.06675/) (2022)
- [Qwen3Guard Technical Report](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.14276/) (2025)
- [FLIRT: Feedback Loop In-context Red Teaming](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.04265/) (2023)
- [Unlearning Concepts in Diffusion Model via Concept Domain Correction and Concept Preserving Gradient](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.15304/) (2024)
- [GuardT2I: Defending Text-to-Image Models from Adversarial Prompts](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.01446/) (2024)
- [Fuzz-Testing Meets LLM-Based Agents: An Automated and Efficient Framework for Jailbreaking Text-To-Image Generation Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2408.00523/) (2024)
- [DiffZOO: A Purely Query-Based Black-Box Attack for Red-teaming Text-to-Image Generative Model via Zeroth Order Optimization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2408.11071/) (2024)
- [T2I-RiskyPrompt: A Benchmark for Safety Evaluation, Attack, and Defense on Text-to-Image Model](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.22300/) (2025)
- [Reason2Attack: Jailbreaking Text-to-Image Models via LLM Reasoning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.17987/) (2025)
- [UPAM: Unified Prompt Attack in Text-to-Image Generation Models Against Both Textual Filters and Visual Checkers](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.11336/) (2024)
- [PLA: Prompt Learning Attack against Text-to-Image Generative Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.03696/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Text-to-Image (T2I) generative models have achieved remarkable progress in synthesizing high-quality visual content, yet they remain vulnerable to adversarial misuse, particularly in generating Not-Safe-For-Work (NSFW) images. Most existing jailbreak attacks primarily rely on heuristic prompt engineering or black-box optimization, treating model feedback as a binary signal (success or failure). This coarse-grained paradigm overlooks the rich information embedded in diverse failure modes, such as textual refusal, visual blocking, and semantic sanitization, resulting in inefficient exploration and severe semantic collapse. In this paper, we propose MIND, a cognitive jailbreak framework that reframes adversarial prompt generation as a belief-state inference problem over latent defense mechanisms. Instead of blindly searching for bypass prompts, MIND actively models the target system's latent defense mechanisms by interpreting multi-modal feedback as high-density signals. Specifically, the framework integrates three core components: (1) a Multi-modal Judge for fine-grained feedback decomposition, (2) a Defense Profiler for iterative belief updating, and (3) a Meta-Memory module for retrieving historically effective attack strategies. These components are unified within a reasoning-driven evolutionary optimization process, enabling adaptive and semantically consistent jailbreak generation. Extensive experiments on the I2P benchmark demonstrate the effectiveness of MIND. Under six representative pre-processing and post-processing defense settings applied to the Stable Diffusion v1.5 model, MIND achieves an Attack Success Rate (ASR) of 95.62%, significantly outperforming existing methods. Additionally, the effectiveness of the proposed framework is validated across four widely used commercial T2I systems, achieving the highest ASR of 91.58% on Wan-2.5.