# !Imperio, smolVLA: The Implications of Data Poisoning on Open Source Robotics

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.04146 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2607.04146/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Prompt injection and agent security, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security.
- Builds on 14 of its 19 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 5 Jul 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM safety and security / [Prompt injection and agent security](https://mlsanity.com/safety/prompt-injection-and-agent-security/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 14 of 14)

- [RT-2: Vision-Language-Action Models Transfer Web Knowledge to Robotic Control](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.15818/) (2023)
- [OpenVLA: An Open-Source Vision-Language-Action Model](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.09246/) (2024)
- [Octo: An Open-Source Generalist Robot Policy](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.12213/) (2024)
- [SmolVLA: A Vision-Language-Action Model for Affordable and Efficient Robotics](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.01844/) (2025)
- [Hidden Trigger Backdoor Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1910.00033/) (2019)
- [Poisoning Web-Scale Training Datasets is Practical](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.10149/) (2023)
- [Poisoning Language Models During Instruction Tuning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.00944/) (2023)
- [Poisoning Attacks on LLMs Require a Near-constant Number of Poison Samples](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.07192/) (2025)
- [MCPTox: A Benchmark for Tool Poisoning Attack on Real-World MCP Servers](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.14925/) (2025)
- [BadVLA: Towards Backdoor Attacks on Vision-Language-Action Models via Objective-Decoupled Optimization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.16640/) (2025)
- [Assessing Political Bias in Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.13041/) (2024)
- [AttackVLA: Benchmarking Adversarial and Backdoor Attacks on Vision-Language-Action Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2511.12149/) (2025)
- [Silent Branding Attack: Trigger-free Data Poisoning Attack on Text-to-Image Diffusion Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.09669/) (2025)
- [Virus Infection Attack on LLMs: Your Poisoning Can Spread "VIA" Synthetic Data](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.23041/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

This work establishes that trigger-word data poisoning of vision language action models is practical, while at the same time the open-source robotics ecosystem holds trust assumptions about community contributions. A few poisoned samples can silently embed a backdoor that disables a robot on command. We evaluate this threat against smolVLA on a real-world pick-and-place task, training on three poison ratios and evaluating across different prompts on the LeRobot platform. Three poisoned episodes in 320 clean episodes suffice for a complete denial of service. Success rate drops to 0.0 plus minus 0.0% across all trigger-word conditions and the robot locks into a fixed joint configuration rather than executing any task-relevant motion. Clean-prompt behaviour holds at approx. 50% success rate across all poison ratios, confirming the attack is stealthy under normal operation. A single poisoned episode already reduces success rate to 6.7 plus minus 6.7%. The robot still moves, but no longer completes the task. The attack generalises to front, middle, and end trigger placements despite training exclusively on front-placed triggers. These findings establish that the threat is practical, low-cost, and stealthy, and warrant treating dataset provenance as a first-class concern in open-source robotics ecosystems.