# Probing the Misaligned Thinking Process of Language Models

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.24251 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.24251/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Prompting and chain-of-thought reasoning, one of 17 directions in LLM reasoning.
- Builds on 26 of its 33 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 23 Jun 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM reasoning / [Prompting and chain-of-thought reasoning](https://mlsanity.com/lr/prompting-and-chain-of-thought-reasoning/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 26 of 26)

- [Qwen3 Technical Report](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.09388/) (2025)
- [Representation Engineering: A Top-Down Approach to AI Transparency](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.01405/) (2023)
- [Towards Understanding Sycophancy in Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.13548/) (2023)
- [The Flan Collection: Designing Data and Methods for Effective Instruction Tuning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2301.13688/) (2023)
- [WildChat: 1M ChatGPT Interaction Logs in the Wild](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.01470/) (2024)
- [GLM-4.5: Agentic, Reasoning, and Coding (ARC) Foundation Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.06471/) (2025)
- [LMSYS-Chat-1M: A Large-Scale Real-World LLM Conversation Dataset](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.11998/) (2023)
- [Monitoring Reasoning Models for Misbehavior and the Risks of Promoting Obfuscation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.11926/) (2025)
- [Alignment faking in large language models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2412.14093/) (2024)
- [Chain of Thought Monitorability: A New and Fragile Opportunity for AI Safety](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.11473/) (2025)
- [AI Control: Improving Safety Despite Intentional Subversion](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.06942/) (2023)
- [Agentic Misalignment: How LLMs Could Be Insider Threats](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.05179/) (2025)
- [Large Language Models can Strategically Deceive their Users when Put Under Pressure](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.07590/) (2023)
- [AI Sandbagging: Language Models can Strategically Underperform on Evaluations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.07358/) (2024)
- [Natural Emergent Misalignment from Reward Hacking in Production RL](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2511.18397/) (2025)
- [The MASK Benchmark: Disentangling Honesty From Accuracy in AI Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.03750/) (2025)
- [SHADE-Arena: Evaluating Sabotage and Monitoring in LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.15740/) (2025)
- [Detecting Strategic Deception Using Linear Probes](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.03407/) (2025)
- [Emotion Concepts and their Function in a Large Language Model](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.07729/) (2026)
- [Constitutional Classifiers++: Efficient Production-Grade Defenses against Universal Jailbreaks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.04603/) (2026)
- [Adaptive Attacks on Trusted Monitors Subvert AI Control Protocols](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.09462/) (2025)
- [Mitigating Deceptive Alignment via Self-Monitoring](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.18807/) (2025)
- [Can Reasoning Models Obfuscate Reasoning? Stress-Testing Chain-of-Thought Monitorability](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.19851/) (2025)
- [Benchmarking Deception Probes via Black-to-White Performance Boosts](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.12691/) (2025)
- [LLMs Can Covertly Sandbag on Capability Evaluations Against Chain-of-Thought Monitoring](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.00943/) (2025)
- [Strategic Dishonesty Can Undermine AI Safety Evaluations of Frontier LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.18058/) (2025)

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Monitoring and Discovering Reward Hacking with Internal Representations during LLM Evaluations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.19101/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Large language models exhibit a growing range of misaligned behaviors such as strategic deception, sandbagging, and self-preservation. As they are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings, it is critical to reliably detect such behaviors to ensure safe and responsible use. In this work, we propose to monitor misalignment by decomposing it into fine-grained cognitive processes -- misalignment indicators -- and detecting their presence in a model's internal activations via linear probes. We develop a taxonomy of 18 indicators spanning different misaligned behaviors, paired with an automated, meta-plan-guided pipeline that generates multi-turn training conversations. To rigorously evaluate generalization, we construct an out-of-distribution suite combining automated behavioral elicitation, established misalignment benchmarks, and natural benign conversations. Across 5 misaligned behaviors, our probes match a strong LLM judge with 0.935 AUROC on out-of-distribution benchmarks while keeping a low false positive rate on benign traffic. We further perform in-depth analysis to understand the probes and the model's internal representations of misalignment indicators.