# Cryptographic certificates of validity for trustworthy AI

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.23768 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.23768/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use.
- Builds on 4 of its 31 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 22 Jun 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM agents and tool use / [Agent threats, guardrails and governance](https://mlsanity.com/agents/agent-threats-guardrails-and-governance/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 4 of 4)

- [Visibility into AI Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2401.13138/) (2024)
- [A Core Model for Choreographic Programming](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1510.03271/) (2015)
- [A verified algebraic representation of Cairo program execution](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2109.14534/) (2021)
- [Functional Choreographic Programming](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2111.03701/) (2021)

## Abstract (arXiv)

We propose cryptographic certificates of validity for agentic AI systems. The core idea is to formally specify a correctness or policy condition as a logical predicate, compile this predicate to a witness-checking problem over polynomial constraints, and use a succinct cryptographic proof system (and optionally zero-knowledge) to certify that the condition holds. This offers a middle ground between formal verification of source code, and cryptographic authentication. An agent's action can be accompanied by an independently checkable proof that it satisfies an agreed formal policy, without requiring the verifier to trust the agent or to re-execute computation. We outline the approach at a high level, give the core mathematical translation, relate the proposal to proof-carrying code, zkVMs, formal methods, and agent governance, and note the specification, auditing, and deployment questions that a full implementation must answer.