# AgenticOS: An Intent-Oriented Secure Operating System Architecture for Autonomous AI Agents

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.21129 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.21129/

## Key facts

- Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use.
- Builds on 3 of its 16 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 19 Jun 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM agents and tool use / [Agent threats, guardrails and governance](https://mlsanity.com/agents/agent-threats-guardrails-and-governance/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 3 of 3)

- [ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2210.03629/) (2022)
- [Toolformer: Language Models Can Teach Themselves to Use Tools](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.04761/) (2023)
- [Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injection](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.12173/) (2023)

## Built on by (most cited first, 2 of 2)

- [When the Agent Becomes the Kernel: A Systematization of Security on the Path to AI-Native Operating Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.23700/) (2026)
- [LeaseGuard: Incumbent-Preserving Admission Control for Privileged LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.24077/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Traditional OS security models based on "resource exposure plus permission checks" face structural challenges as LLM-driven autonomous agents acquire capabilities for planning, tool use, network access, and code execution. Once an agent runtime is compromised through prompt injection or malicious tool outputs, an attacker can compose POSIX-style resource primitives into behaviors far beyond the user's task authorization. To address this, we propose AgenticOS, an intent-oriented secure OS architecture that consolidates delegable, auditable software capabilities into OS-native ones rather than replacing all applications. The core insight is to reframe the OS from a "resource manager" into an "intent filter": instead of requesting low-level resources directly, agents submit structured intent declarations, from which the system synthesizes a least-privilege environment with mandatory mediation, auditing, and information-flow constraints. At the implementation level, we introduce a four-layer architecture -- Ghost Kernel, Logic Shutter, Agent Capsule, and Semantic Boundary Gateway -- together with the Intent ABI, Manifest-Only Runtime, Weaver-based capability generation, and an admission model for AgenticOS-native Skills.
