# Deontic Policies for Runtime Governance of Agentic AI Systems

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.19464 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.19464/

## Key facts

- Cited by 5 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use.
- Builds on 15 of its 79 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 17 Jun 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM agents and tool use / [Agent threats, guardrails and governance](https://mlsanity.com/agents/agent-threats-guardrails-and-governance/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 15 of 15)

- [InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.02691/) (2024)
- [Agent Security Bench (ASB): Formalizing and Benchmarking Attacks and Defenses in LLM-based Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.02644/) (2024)
- [AgentSpec: Customizable Runtime Enforcement for Safe and Reliable LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.18666/) (2025)
- [ShieldAgent: Shielding Agents via Verifiable Safety Policy Reasoning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.22738/) (2025)
- [AI Agents Under Threat: A Survey of Key Security Challenges and Future Pathways](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.02630/) (2024)
- [Authenticated Delegation and Authorized AI Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2501.09674/) (2025)
- [Taming Various Privilege Escalation in LLM-Based Agent Systems: A Mandatory Access Control Framework](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2601.11893/) (2026)
- [VeriGuard: Enhancing LLM Agent Safety via Verified Code Generation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.05156/) (2025)
- [SAGA: A Security Architecture for Governing AI Agentic Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.21034/) (2025)
- [Cedar: A New Language for Expressive, Fast, Safe, and Analyzable Authorization (Extended Version)](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.04651/) (2024)
- [Policy-as-Prompt: Turning AI Governance Rules into Guardrails for AI Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.23994/) (2025)
- [From Governance Norms to Enforceable Controls: A Layered Translation Method for Runtime Guardrails in Agentic AI](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.05229/) (2026)
- [A2AS: Agentic AI Runtime Security and Self-Defense](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.13825/) (2025)
- [Agent-Fence: Mapping Security Vulnerabilities Across Deep Research Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2602.07652/) (2026)
- [Autonomous Agents and Policy Compliance: A Framework for Reasoning About Penalties](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2512.03931/) (2025)

## Built on by (most cited first, 5 of 5)

- [Are You Still the Agent I Authorized? Earned Authority under a Fixed Ceiling for Evolving Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2607.23586/) (2026)
- [Where Reliability Lives: Experimental Localisation of Behavioural Properties in an Agent System](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.03192/) (2026)
- [How Strongly Should Task State Influence an LLM Agent?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.25686/) (2026)
- [From Agent Output to Authorized Transition](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.28216/) (2026)
- [Subjects, Not Authors: The Authorship Hazard in Agentic Dataspaces](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.30614/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Autonomous agentic AI systems driven by Large Language Models (LLMs) introduce a new class of security, privacy, and compliance challenges: an agent that can invoke tools, manipulate data, install software, and coordinate with peer agents across organizational boundaries must be constrained not just by authentication and access control, but by the full structure of enterprise governance. This includes specifying what agents are permitted and prohibited from doing, what they areobliged to do after certain actions (e.g., notify the CISO), under what conditions a standing obligation may be waived, and which rules take precedence when policies conflict. This governance problem exceeds what current policy engines provide. Systems such as XACML, Rego, and Cedar address only the permit/prohibit subset of this governance structure. They do not provide obligation lifecycle management, meta-policy conflict resolution, dispensations that waive obligations in specific circumstances, and ontological reasoning over domain class hierarchies commonly found in applications such as healthcare, cybersecurity, or data privacy. We propose AgenticRei, which realizes key governance requirements such as obligations, dispensations, policy conflict resolutions, and reasoning over policies, as well as the basic permit/prohibit constraints. We use a deontic policy language built on the Rei framework, expressed as OWL (Web Ontology Language) and evaluated at runtime by a high-performance logic engine entirely outside the LLM. The same pipeline governs both tool invocations by the agent and agent-to-agent messages. We show through examples that deontic policies capture governance constraints around security and privacy that mostly cannot be expressed in current production engines. Our approach composes naturally with industry-standard frameworks like A2AS.