# Gaming-Resistant Insurance Contracts for Autonomous AI Agents: Strategy-Proof Toll Mechanism Design

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.16326 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.16326/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 15 of its 66 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 15 Jun 2026.

## Builds on (most cited first, 15 of 15)

- [Training language models to follow instructions with human feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.02155/) (2022)
- [SWE-bench: Can Language Models Resolve Real-World GitHub Issues?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.06770/) (2023)
- [Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2212.08073/) (2022)
- [τ-bench: A Benchmark for Tool-Agent-User Interaction in Real-World Domains](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.12045/) (2024)
- [AgentBench: Evaluating LLMs as Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.03688/) (2023)
- [A Gentle Introduction to Conformal Prediction and Distribution-Free Uncertainty Quantification](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2107.07511/) (2021)
- [Adaptive Conformal Inference Under Distribution Shift](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2106.00170/) (2021)
- [NeMo Guardrails: A Toolkit for Controllable and Safe LLM Applications with Programmable Rails](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.10501/) (2023)
- [Optimizing the CVaR via Sampling](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1404.3862/) (2014)
- [Algorithms for CVaR Optimization in MDPs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1406.3339/) (2014)
- [Quantifying Trust: Financial Risk Management for Trustworthy AI Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.03976/) (2026)
- [Algorithmic Insurance](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2106.00839/) (2021)
- [Insuring Every Action: An Authority Frontier Framework for Runtime Actuarial Control of Autonomous AI Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.25632/) (2026)
- [Catastrophe Insurance: An Adaptive Robust Optimization Approach](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.07068/) (2024)
- [Foundations of a Time-Consistent Counterfactual Actuarial Runtime for Autonomous AI Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.26508/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Paper A defines a time-consistent actuarial runtime that prices each side-effect-bearing action against a contractually fixed safe default and gates execution against a reserve budget. It treats the operator as passive. This paper makes the operator strategic. We characterise a five-attack space for autonomous AI-agent insurance contracts and prove when the actuarial runtime is gaming-resistant. Two attack surfaces -- post-toll safe-default selection and within-boundary action splitting -- are closed by Paper A's minimal-authority and no-splitting clauses. The remaining three require new contract clauses. First, common-control aggregation prevents cross-boundary re-routing from reducing toll below the boundary potential applied to total exposure. Second, interface failures such as invalid JSON are contract-relevant events, not safety wins: treating them as zero-toll safe defaults can reward unreliable models, while escalation fees reverse the incentive. We validate this interface-compliance theorem on committed cross-model traces from the companion empirical paper. Third, a model-identity menu with a componentwise-minimum penalty schedule makes truthful reporting of the deployed model weakly dominant. We then compose these clauses with Paper A's runtime guarantees to obtain joint incentive compatibility over the five-attack space. Finally, a two-parameter premium family discharges operator individual rationality and weak budget balance at the truthful equilibrium. The result is an incentive-compatibility layer for actuarial control of autonomous-agent side effects.