# AI Researchers Must Help Lead Arms Control to Mitigate Military AI Risks

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.11533 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.11533/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 22 of its 72 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 10 Jun 2026.

## Builds on (most cited first, 22 of 22)

- [GPT-4 Technical Report](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.08774/) (2023)
- [Mechanistic Interpretability for AI Safety -- A Review](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.14082/) (2024)
- [Alignment faking in large language models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2412.14093/) (2024)
- [Exploring Collaboration Mechanisms for LLM Agents: A Social Psychology View](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.02124/) (2023)
- [Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning in Sequential Social Dilemmas](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1702.03037/) (2017)
- [Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.14143/) (2025)
- [Tamper-Resistant Safeguards for Open-Weight LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2408.00761/) (2024)
- [Cooperate or Collapse: Emergence of Sustainable Cooperation in a Society of LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.16698/) (2024)
- [Social Choice Should Guide AI Alignment in Dealing with Diverse Human Feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.10271/) (2024)
- [Frontier AI Regulation: Managing Emerging Risks to Public Safety](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.03718/) (2023)
- [Large language models surpass human experts in predicting neuroscience results](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.03230/) (2024)
- [Escalation Risks from Language Models in Military and Diplomatic Decision-Making](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2401.03408/) (2024)
- [Gradual Disempowerment: Systemic Existential Risks from Incremental AI Development](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2501.16946/) (2025)
- [Computing Power and the Governance of Artificial Intelligence](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.08797/) (2024)
- [Nuclear Deployed: Analyzing Catastrophic Risks in Decision-making of Autonomous LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.11355/) (2025)
- [Lessons from a Chimp: AI "Scheming" and the Quest for Ape Language](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.03409/) (2025)
- [Evaluating and Understanding Scheming Propensity in LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.01608/) (2026)
- [AI-Powered Autonomous Weapons Risk Geopolitical Instability and Threaten AI Research](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.01859/) (2024)
- [MO-MIX: Multi-Objective Multi-Agent Cooperative Decision-Making With Deep Reinforcement Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.00730/) (2026)
- [Superintelligence Strategy: Expert Version](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.05628/) (2025)
- [Military AI Needs Technically-Informed Regulation to Safeguard AI Research and its Applications](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.18371/) (2025)
- [NeurIPS should lead scientific consensus on AI policy](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.00075/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

The advancement of AI capabilities compels researchers and the public to be more aware of its potential worldwide impact. A pressing near-term concern is the regulation of military AI applications. Armament manufacturers and defense contractors are increasingly investing in AI capabilities and forging partnerships with AI companies, creating a burgeoning coalition that demands military leaders, arms control diplomacy experts, and AI researchers collaborate to ensure a safer future. While AI researchers often focus on the long-term implications of superintelligent AI, this approach may not adequately address the immediate challenges posed by AI in military applications. Success requires acknowledging and mitigating the emerging risks of frontier AI models that plan to be integrated into defense applications, like military AI systems. Arms control has reduced past catastrophic risks, so lessons learned from nuclear deterrence can guide AI safety and security research towards innovations in verification and diplomacy. AI researchers, however, must assist in leading the technical research that clearly defines and alleviates instability in military settings. Given these new responsibilities and the lack of sufficiently reliable solutions, we argue that AI researchers must take a leading role in advancing arms control research to minimize risk in military AI applications.