# Deployment-Time Memorization in Foundation-Model Agents

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.10062 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.10062/

## Key facts

- Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Agent memory systems, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use.
- Builds on 16 of its 21 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 8 Jun 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM agents and tool use / [Agent memory systems](https://mlsanity.com/agents/agent-memory-systems/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 16 of 16)

- [Retrieval-Augmented Generation for Knowledge-Intensive NLP Tasks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2005.11401/) (2020)
- [Sentence-BERT: Sentence Embeddings using Siamese BERT-Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1908.10084/) (2019)
- [Generative Agents: Interactive Simulacra of Human Behavior](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.03442/) (2023)
- [Deep Learning with Differential Privacy](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1607.00133/) (2016)
- [Extracting Training Data from Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2012.07805/) (2020)
- [Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injection](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.12173/) (2023)
- [Machine Unlearning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1912.03817/) (2019)
- [The Secret Sharer: Evaluating and Testing Unintended Memorization in Neural Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1802.08232/) (2018)
- [Quantifying Memorization Across Neural Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2202.07646/) (2022)
- [LongMemEval: Benchmarking Chat Assistants on Long-Term Interactive Memory](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.10813/) (2024)
- [Scalable Extraction of Training Data from (Production) Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.17035/) (2023)
- [Can LLMs Keep a Secret? Testing Privacy Implications of Language Models via Contextual Integrity Theory](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.17884/) (2023)
- [Unveiling Privacy Risks in LLM Agent Memory](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.13172/) (2025)
- [A Survey on Long-Term Memory Security in LLM Agents: Attacks, Defenses, and Governance Across the Memory Lifecycle](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.16548/) (2026)
- [Adaptive Memory Admission Control for LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.04549/) (2026)
- [Trojan Hippo: Weaponizing Agent Memory for Data Exfiltration](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.01970/) (2026)

## Built on by (most cited first, 4 of 4)

- [Always-OnAgents:A Survey of Persistent Memory, State, and Governance in LLMAgents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.30306/) (2026)
- [Winning by Peeking: Unenforced Budgets and Test-Set Selection Inflate Short-Budget AutoML Comparisons](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.07303/) (2026)
- [Inferring Hidden User Models from the Behavior of Personalized LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.03815/) (2026)
- [Audience-Bound Persistent Memory: Authorization Across the Memory Lifecycle](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.36373/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Foundation-model agents are increasingly long-lived systems that remember users across interactions, making memorization an explicit deployment-time function rather than solely a property of model weights. Existing work addresses parametric memorization or audits fixed memory configurations, but does not characterize how memory-design choices jointly shape personalization utility, extraction risk, and deletion fidelity. We study this surface as deployment-time memorization, formulating agent memory as a privacy-utility frontier measured by Personalization Recall (PR) and Adversarial Extraction Rate (AER), and sweeping three memory-design knobs: summarization aggressiveness, retrieval breadth (k), and deletion mode. We further introduce the Forgetting Residue Score (FRS) to quantify whether deleted information remains recoverable from derived memory tiers. On LongMemEval, key-fact summarization reduces canary extraction by 76% on Gemma 3 12B and 64% on GPT-4o-mini while preserving nearly all personalization recall; critically, once content is compressed away, increasing k no longer restores leakage. The same compression, however, induces a deletion-fidelity failure: raw-only deletion leaves derived summary copies recoverable in approximately 20% of instances, and only full-pipeline purge or tombstone redaction drives worst-tier residue to zero. Together, these results establish that persistent agent memory must be evaluated as a first-class memorization mechanism -- assessed by what it helps agents recall, what it makes extractable, and what it can truly erase.