# PrivacyPeek: Auditing What LLM-Based Agents Acquire, Not Just What They Say

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.00152 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.00152/

## Key facts

- Cited by 6 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use.
- Builds on 16 of its 28 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 29 May 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM agents and tool use / [Agent threats, guardrails and governance](https://mlsanity.com/agents/agent-threats-guardrails-and-governance/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 16 of 16)

- [Qwen3 Technical Report](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.09388/) (2025)
- [ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2210.03629/) (2022)
- [Judging LLM-as-a-Judge with MT-Bench and Chatbot Arena](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.05685/) (2023)
- [GPT-4o System Card](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.21276/) (2024)
- [WebArena: A Realistic Web Environment for Building Autonomous Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.13854/) (2023)
- [The Rise and Potential of Large Language Model Based Agents: A Survey](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.07864/) (2023)
- [AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.09024/) (2024)
- [AgentPoison: Red-teaming LLM Agents via Poisoning Memory or Knowledge Bases](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.12784/) (2024)
- [Agent Security Bench (ASB): Formalizing and Benchmarking Attacks and Defenses in LLM-based Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.02644/) (2024)
- [Can LLMs Keep a Secret? Testing Privacy Implications of Language Models via Contextual Integrity Theory](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.17884/) (2023)
- [PrivacyLens: Evaluating Privacy Norm Awareness of Language Models in Action](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2409.00138/) (2024)
- [A Survey of LLM-based Agents in Medicine: How far are we from Baymax?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.11211/) (2025)
- [AgentDAM: Privacy Leakage Evaluation for Autonomous Web Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.09780/) (2025)
- [AgentSCOPE: Evaluating Contextual Privacy Across Agentic Workflows](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.04902/) (2026)
- [AgentRaft: Automated Detection of Data Over-Exposure in LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.07557/) (2026)
- [Do LLMs Know What Is Private Internally? Probing and Steering Contextual Privacy Norms in Large Language Model Representations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.00209/) (2026)

## Built on by (most cited first, 6 of 6)

- [When Agents Learn to Be You: Benchmarking Privacy Leakage, Impersonation Risk, and Defenses in Persona Skills](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.03700/) (2026)
- [Inferring Hidden User Models from the Behavior of Personalized LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.03815/) (2026)
- [PrivacySkills: How Privacy Guidance Shapes Source Selection in LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.35937/) (2026)
- [Privacy in Personalized AI Is a System Property, Not Just a Model Property](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.38289/) (2026)
- [AgentPrivArena: Evaluating and Auditing Real-world AI Agent Privacy](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.06454/) (2026)
- [Before Agent Tells The Lie: Has Deception Already Been Represented?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.06576/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

LLM-based agents are rapidly advancing, autonomously invoking external tools to complete multi-step tasks for users. However, agents often acquire more sensitive information than the task requires. Existing privacy benchmarks audit what the agent's response or outgoing actions disclose, but overlook the acquisition stage where data first enters the agent's context. The over-acquired information is then one careless action or one attack away from an outright leak. To assess its prevalence, we introduce PrivacyPeek, a benchmark for evaluating acquisition-stage privacy leakage of LLM-based agents, with 1,182 cases across 7 acquisition behaviours and 16 application domains. Specifically, Acquisition Inspection examines the agent's tool-call trajectory, both the tools it invokes and the data it receives, to detect when it acquires sensitive information beyond the task scope. Probe Elicitation then issues a follow-up probe and measures how readily an attacker could elicit sensitive information the agent acquired but did not disclose. Our experiments on 10 LLM-based agents across 4 model families show that the unnecessary acquisition of sensitive information is widespread. In addition, we observe a correlation between the task-completion capability and acquisition-stage leakage. Prompt-level defences reduce only a small fraction of acquisition-stage leakage, leaving the majority unmitigated. These results make auditing acquisition-stage privacy both urgent and necessary. Our dataset and code are available at https://github.com/Xuan269/PrivacyPeek-Resource.