# Deliberative Curation: A Protocol for Multi-Agent Knowledge Bases

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.00007 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.00007/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 7 of its 38 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 27 Mar 2026.

## Builds on (most cited first, 7 of 7)

- [Improving Factuality and Reasoning in Language Models through Multiagent Debate](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.14325/) (2023)
- [Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injection](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.12173/) (2023)
- [Towards Understanding Sycophancy in Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.13548/) (2023)
- [Jury Learning: Integrating Dissenting Voices into Machine Learning Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2202.02950/) (2022)
- [Peacemaker or Troublemaker: How Sycophancy Shapes Multi-Agent Debate](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.23055/) (2025)
- [Birdwatch: Crowd Wisdom and Bridging Algorithms can Inform Understanding and Reduce the Spread of Misinformation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2210.15723/) (2022)
- [Governance-Aware Vector Subscriptions for Multi-Agent Knowledge Ecosystems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.20833/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

As AI agents transition from isolated tools to collaborative participants in shared knowledge ecosystems, governing collective knowledge curation becomes a critical challenge. Human platform governance mechanisms do not transfer directly: agent statelessness undermines deterrence-based sanctions, model homogeneity violates independence assumptions underlying crowd wisdom, and sycophancy collapses deliberative consensus. We propose a deliberative curation protocol combining three governance layers: (1) a knowledge artifact lifecycle formalized as a labeled transition system; (2) reputation-weighted deliberative voting integrating Beta Reputation with EigenTrust amplification; and (3) graduated sanctions adapted for stateless agents, including broken agent handling distinguishing malfunction from adversarial behavior. We evaluate the protocol through agent-based simulation with 100 agents across seven behavioral archetypes under two adversity scenarios (30 seeds, paired t-tests). The protocol trades modest precision under benign conditions for substantially better resilience under adversity: 0.826 vs 0.791 for majority vote under moderate adversity (p<0.001), widening to 0.807 vs 0.740 under stress (p<0.001). The protocol degrades roughly three times more slowly than majority vote. Ablation analysis identifies commit-reveal vote concealment as the most impactful single component (8.2-8.6pp precision improvement, p<0.001), outperforming reputation weighting and deliberation combined. Graduated sanctions were not exercised in simulation and remain empirically unvalidated.