# Can Quantum Federated Learning Withstand Circuit-Level Backdoors?

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.27416 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.27416/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 12 of its 26 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 18 May 2026.

## Builds on (most cited first, 12 of 12)

- [PyTorch: An Imperative Style, High-Performance Deep Learning Library](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1912.01703/) (2019)
- [Communication-Efficient Learning of Deep Networks from Decentralized Data](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1602.05629/) (2016)
- [Advances and Open Problems in Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1912.04977/) (2019)
- [How To Backdoor Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1807.00459/) (2018)
- [Byzantine-Robust Distributed Learning: Towards Optimal Statistical Rates](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1803.01498/) (2018)
- [Mitigating Sybils in Federated Learning Poisoning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1808.04866/) (2018)
- [Quantum Adversarial Machine Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2001.00030/) (2019)
- [Towards Quantum Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.09912/) (2023)
- [Long-Short History of Gradients is All You Need: Detecting Malicious and Unreliable Clients in Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2208.10273/) (2022)
- [Quantum Federated Learning: Analysis, Design and Implementation Challenges](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.15708/) (2023)
- [When Federated Learning Meets Quantum Computing: Survey and Research Opportunities](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.08814/) (2025)
- [Tackling Selfish Clients in Federated Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.15402/) (2024)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Quantum Federated Learning (QFL) inherits the core vulnerability of federated optimization to malicious clients, while also introducing an attack surface from variational circuit training and measurement-driven gradients. This work proposes a novel CircUit-Level backdoor Threat (CULT) model that formalizes four stealthy attacks by exploiting quantum-aware mechanisms, including Grover, Pauli, Bit-flip, and Sign-flip. By enabling malicious clients on both in-training and post-training surfaces, these attacks can critically undermine the learning process. We establish a rigorous theoretical foundation to demonstrate attack stealthiness under standard smoothness assumptions. Experiments on the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets with non-IID splits and varying fractions of malicious clients show that even a single malicious client can induce severe accuracy degradation under FedAvg aggregation. While popular defenses, including Krum, Multi-Krum, FoolsGold, FLGuardian, and Mud-HoG, reduce degradation in many regimes, they fail to eliminate worst-case failure cases, where accuracy drops up to 50%. The experimental analysis further reveals that under the CULT model, malicious updates effectively mask their presence by staying close to benign norms, thereby helping attackers evade detection.
