# Erased but Exploitable: Black-box Embedding-Aware Prompting Against Unlearned Text-to-Image Diffusion Models

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.26332 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.26332/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Robustness, privacy and adversarial aspects, one of 14 directions in Diffusion models.
- Builds on 33 of its 52 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 25 May 2026.

## Placed in

- Diffusion models / [Robustness, privacy and adversarial aspects](https://mlsanity.com/diffusion/robustness-privacy-and-adversarial-aspects/)
- LLM safety and security / [Vision-language and text-to-image safety](https://mlsanity.com/safety/vision-language-and-text-to-image-safety/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 30 of 33)

- [Deep Residual Learning for Image Recognition](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1512.03385/) (2015)
- [BERT: Pre-training of Deep Bidirectional Transformers for Language Understanding](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1810.04805/) (2018)
- [Learning Transferable Visual Models From Natural Language Supervision](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2103.00020/) (2021)
- [High-Resolution Image Synthesis with Latent Diffusion Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2112.10752/) (2021)
- [DINOv2: Learning Robust Visual Features without Supervision](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.07193/) (2023)
- [SDXL: Improving Latent Diffusion Models for High-Resolution Image Synthesis](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.01952/) (2023)
- [Scaling Rectified Flow Transformers for High-Resolution Image Synthesis](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.03206/) (2024)
- [ImageReward: Learning and Evaluating Human Preferences for Text-to-Image Generation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.05977/) (2023)
- [Erasing Concepts from Diffusion Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.07345/) (2023)
- [Safe Latent Diffusion: Mitigating Inappropriate Degeneration in Diffusion Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2211.05105/) (2022)
- [Making AI Forget You: Data Deletion in Machine Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1907.05012/) (2019)
- [Unified Concept Editing in Diffusion Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.14761/) (2023)
- [SalUn: Empowering Machine Unlearning via Gradient-based Weight Saliency in Both Image Classification and Generation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.12508/) (2023)
- [Ablating Concepts in Text-to-Image Diffusion Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.13516/) (2023)
- [A Survey of Machine Unlearning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2209.02299/) (2022)
- [MACE: Mass Concept Erasure in Diffusion Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.06135/) (2024)
- [Forget-Me-Not: Learning to Forget in Text-to-Image Diffusion Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.17591/) (2023)
- [Red-Teaming the Stable Diffusion Safety Filter](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2210.04610/) (2022)
- [Ring-A-Bell! How Reliable are Concept Removal Methods for Diffusion Models?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.10012/) (2023)
- [To Generate or Not? Safety-Driven Unlearned Diffusion Models Are Still Easy To Generate Unsafe Images ... For Now](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.11868/) (2023)
- [Defining and Characterizing Reward Hacking](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2209.13085/) (2022)
- [MMA-Diffusion: MultiModal Attack on Diffusion Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.17516/) (2023)
- [SneakyPrompt: Jailbreaking Text-to-image Generative Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.12082/) (2023)
- [Prompting4Debugging: Red-Teaming Text-to-Image Diffusion Models by Finding Problematic Prompts](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.06135/) (2023)
- [One-Dimensional Adapter to Rule Them All: Concepts, Diffusion Models and Erasing Applications](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.16145/) (2023)
- [Receler: Reliable Concept Erasing of Text-to-Image Diffusion Models via Lightweight Erasers](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.17717/) (2023)
- [ReNO: Enhancing One-step Text-to-Image Models through Reward-based Noise Optimization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.04312/) (2024)
- [A Pilot Study of Query-Free Adversarial Attack against Stable Diffusion](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2303.16378/) (2023)
- [SafeGen: Mitigating Sexually Explicit Content Generation in Text-to-Image Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.06666/) (2024)
- [ShieldLM: Empowering LLMs as Aligned, Customizable and Explainable Safety Detectors](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.16444/) (2024)

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Weeding Out Bad Seeds: Initial-Noise-Robust Unlearning for Text-to-Image Diffusion Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.37537/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Machine unlearning aims to remove specific concepts from pretrained text-to-image diffusion models, yet several white- and black-box attacks have been introduced to make the model generate such unlearned concepts. These attacks, nevertheless, do not assume a realistic threat model, i.e. they either assume access to the model weights, or result in gibberish adversarial prompts that could be easily detected even through naive rule-based safeguarding. We aim to address this gap in this paper. We introduce BEAP, a black-box, embedding-aware adversarial prompting attack that leverages a large language model (LLM) to iteratively generate effective adversarial prompts and exploit such hidden vulnerabilities. BEAP performs an embedding-aware search in text space, combining multiple reward signals: unlearned concept presence, text-image alignment, and image quality, to refine generated prompts. Unlike previous attack methods, BEAP keeps its prompts undetectable to safety filters while producing high-quality images. Across five unlearning methods, BEAP achieves a macro-averaged ASR of 97.8% under the held-out OpenNSFW2 evaluation, exceeding the white-box UDA baseline by 41.6 percentage points (56.2% to 97.8%). Counting unsuccessful searches at the full 100-query budget, BEAP uses 32.1 image-generation queries per evaluated prompt on average under this criterion.