# When Agents Control Robots: A Zero Trust Policy Model for Agentic Cyber-Physical Systems

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.25653 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.25653/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use.
- Builds on 3 of its 19 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 25 May 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM agents and tool use / [Agent threats, guardrails and governance](https://mlsanity.com/agents/agent-threats-guardrails-and-governance/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 3 of 3)

- [RT-2: Vision-Language-Action Models Transfer Web Knowledge to Robotic Control](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.15818/) (2023)
- [NeMo Guardrails: A Toolkit for Controllable and Safe LLM Applications with Programmable Rails](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.10501/) (2023)
- [Towards Robust and Secure Embodied AI: A Survey on Vulnerabilities and Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.13175/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Multi-agent systems powered by large foundation models (LFMs) are increasingly deployed to control industrial robots through natural language, creating deployments in which security failures produce physical consequences. We analyse this threat landscape through Cobot-Claw, a deployed four-agent system for UR3e robotic arm control, and identify five attack classes specific to agentic cyber-physical systems. We propose ZTPM, a Zero Trust Policy Model comprising 25 typed primitives across five enforcement domains with Physical Impact Tiers as a runtime policy dimension. An empirical evaluation across 60 execution traces on two LFM backends provides initial evidence that actuation parameter selection is model-dependent and non-deterministic, motivating the need for policy-level enforcement at the physical actuation boundary.