# Latent-space Attacks for Refusal Evasion in Language Models

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.21706 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.21706/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Safety alignment and jailbreak attacks, one of 10 directions in LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation.
- Builds on 18 of its 23 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 20 May 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation / [Safety alignment and jailbreak attacks](https://mlsanity.com/alignment/safety-alignment-and-jailbreak-attacks/)
- LLM safety and security / [Safety alignment, refusal and guardrails](https://mlsanity.com/safety/safety-alignment-refusal-and-guardrails/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 18 of 18)

- [Training a Helpful and Harmless Assistant with Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2204.05862/) (2022)
- [Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.15043/) (2023)
- [HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusal](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.04249/) (2024)
- [DeepFool: a simple and accurate method to fool deep neural networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1511.04599/) (2015)
- [Steering Llama 2 via Contrastive Activation Addition](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.06681/) (2023)
- [Refusal in Language Models Is Mediated by a Single Direction](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.11717/) (2024)
- [Steering Language Models With Activation Engineering](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.10248/) (2023)
- [The Linear Representation Hypothesis and the Geometry of Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.03658/) (2023)
- [Jailbreaking Leading Safety-Aligned LLMs with Simple Adaptive Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.02151/) (2024)
- [Catastrophic Jailbreak of Open-source LLMs via Exploiting Generation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.06987/) (2023)
- [Improving Alignment and Robustness with Circuit Breakers](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.04313/) (2024)
- [Not All Language Model Features Are One-Dimensionally Linear](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2405.14860/) (2024)
- [The Geometry of Refusal in Large Language Models: Concept Cones and Representational Independence](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.17420/) (2025)
- [Language Models Use Trigonometry to Do Addition](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.00873/) (2025)
- [The Origins of Representation Manifolds in Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.18235/) (2025)
- [Accelerating Greedy Coordinate Gradient and General Prompt Optimization via Probe Sampling](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.01251/) (2024)
- [One-shot Optimized Steering Vectors Mediate Safety-relevant Behaviors in LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2502.18862/) (2025)
- [SOM Directions are Better than One: Multi-Directional Refusal Suppression in Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2511.08379/) (2025)

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Uncensored Open-weight Models: Redistribution as the Persistence Layer](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.05241/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Safety-aligned language models are trained to refuse harmful requests, yet refusal behavior can be suppressed by steering their internal representations. Existing methods do so by ablating a refusal direction from model activations, aiming to remove refusal from the model's residual stream. Despite their empirical success, these methods lack a principled account of the latent-space transformation they induce and why it suppresses refusal. In this work, we recast refusal suppression as a latent-space evasion attack against linear probes trained to separate refused from answered prompts. Under this view, prior work's difference-in-means direction naturally defines such a probe, and its ablation is exactly a projection onto its decision boundary, i.e., a minimum-confidence evasion attack. This perspective not only explains the empirical success of prior work but also admits a key limitation: evasion stops at the decision boundary, motivating the need to push representations further into the compliant region, i.e., where the model answers. We leverage this by proposing a Controlled Latent-space Evasion attack that projects representations past the boundary with an optimized confidence. We achieve state-of-the-art attack success rate across 15 instruction-tuned, multimodal, and reasoning models, outperforming existing refusal-ablation baselines and specialized jailbreak attacks.