# The Evaluation Game: Beyond Static LLM Benchmarking

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.19377 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.19377/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Jailbreaking, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security.
- Builds on 43 of its 55 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 19 May 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM safety and security / [Jailbreaking](https://mlsanity.com/safety/jailbreaking/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 30 of 43)

- [Training language models to follow instructions with human feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.02155/) (2022)
- [The Llama 3 Herd of Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.21783/) (2024)
- [Measuring Massive Multitask Language Understanding](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2009.03300/) (2020)
- [Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examples](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1412.6572/) (2014)
- [Towards Deep Learning Models Resistant to Adversarial Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1706.06083/) (2017)
- [Intriguing properties of neural networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1312.6199/) (2013)
- [Qwen2.5 Technical Report](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2412.15115/) (2024)
- [Deep reinforcement learning from human preferences](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1706.03741/) (2017)
- [Training a Helpful and Harmless Assistant with Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2204.05862/) (2022)
- [Mistral 7B](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.06825/) (2023)
- [Pointer Sentinel Mixture Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1609.07843/) (2016)
- [Pythia: A Suite for Analyzing Large Language Models Across Training and Scaling](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.01373/) (2023)
- [Jailbroken: How Does LLM Safety Training Fail?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.02483/) (2023)
- [Group Equivariant Convolutional Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1602.07576/) (2016)
- [Fine-tuning Aligned Language Models Compromises Safety, Even When Users Do Not Intend To!](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.03693/) (2023)
- [Red Teaming Language Models with Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2202.03286/) (2022)
- [Introduction to Online Convex Optimization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1909.05207/) (2019)
- [Universal Adversarial Triggers for Attacking and Analyzing NLP](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1908.07125/) (2019)
- [Adversarial Examples for Evaluating Reading Comprehension Systems](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1707.07328/) (2017)
- [Safety Alignment Should Be Made More Than Just a Few Tokens Deep](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.05946/) (2024)
- [Performative Prediction](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2002.06673/) (2020)
- [Strategic Classification](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1506.06980/) (2015)
- [WildTeaming at Scale: From In-the-Wild Jailbreaks to (Adversarially) Safer Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.18510/) (2024)
- [MART: Improving LLM Safety with Multi-round Automatic Red-Teaming](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2311.07689/) (2023)
- [Strategic Classification from Revealed Preferences](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1710.07887/) (2017)
- [Preserving Statistical Validity in Adaptive Data Analysis](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1411.2664/) (2014)
- [JailbreakRadar: Comprehensive Assessment of Jailbreak Attacks Against LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.05668/) (2024)
- [On the Benefits of Invariance in Neural Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2005.00178/) (2020)
- [The Ladder: A Reliable Leaderboard for Machine Learning Competitions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1502.04585/) (2015)
- [Active Fairness Auditing](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2206.08450/) (2022)

## Abstract (arXiv)

As jailbreaks, adversarially crafted inputs that bypass safety constraints, continue to be discovered in Large Language Models, practitioners increasingly rely on fine-tuning as a defensive strategy. Yet the theoretical foundations underlying this robustness fine-tuning remain underexplored. We introduce a game-theoretic framework in which the interaction between an evaluator (auditing the model for jailbreaks) and a trainer is formalized as a two-player game. A key feature of our approach is the use of group actions, a mathematical structure that captures symmetries and transformations, to formally represent data augmentation. The simplest non-trivial instance is the circle with cyclic translation groups, where we exhibit various regimes depending on the trainer's generalization range. Below a critical threshold, the evaluator maintains a constant miss ratio for linearly many rounds, whereas other settings can yield very different behaviors. We further provide empirical evidence supporting locality-dependence of the model: for the three model families we tested (Llama, Qwen and Mistral), we have significant evidence that fine-tuning on adversarial prompts induces only local generalization, with refusal rates on test examples highly correlated with the distance to the fine-tuning prompts. Our framework recasts the central object of adversarial evaluation: a benchmark is not a static set of prompts but an orbit under the evaluator's group action, and audit protocols that ignore trainer-side adaptation cannot distinguish a genuine fix from a memorized patch.
