# WARD: Adversarially Robust Defense of Web Agents Against Prompt Injections

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.15030 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.15030/

## Key facts

- Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use.
- Builds on 63 of its 79 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 14 May 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM agents and tool use / [Agent threats, guardrails and governance](https://mlsanity.com/agents/agent-threats-guardrails-and-governance/)
- LLM safety and security / [Prompt injection and agent security](https://mlsanity.com/safety/prompt-injection-and-agent-security/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 30 of 63)

- [Training language models to follow instructions with human feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.02155/) (2022)
- [DeepSeekMath: Pushing the Limits of Mathematical Reasoning in Open Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.03300/) (2024)
- [Direct Preference Optimization: Your Language Model is Secretly a Reward Model](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.18290/) (2023)
- [Dense Passage Retrieval for Open-Domain Question Answering](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2004.04906/) (2020)
- [HotpotQA: A Dataset for Diverse, Explainable Multi-hop Question Answering](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1809.09600/) (2018)
- [WebArena: A Realistic Web Environment for Building Autonomous Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.13854/) (2023)
- [Jailbroken: How Does LLM Safety Training Fail?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.02483/) (2023)
- [MS MARCO: A Human Generated MAchine Reading COmprehension Dataset](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1611.09268/) (2016)
- [Know What You Don't Know: Unanswerable Questions for SQuAD](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1806.03822/) (2018)
- [WebShop: Towards Scalable Real-World Web Interaction with Grounded Language Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2207.01206/) (2022)
- [Mind2Web: Towards a Generalist Agent for the Web](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.06070/) (2023)
- [A General Language Assistant as a Laboratory for Alignment](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2112.00861/) (2021)
- [Ignore Previous Prompt: Attack Techniques For Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2211.09527/) (2022)
- [UI-TARS: Pioneering Automated GUI Interaction with Native Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2501.12326/) (2025)
- [GPT-4V(ision) is a Generalist Web Agent, if Grounded](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2401.01614/) (2024)
- [A Dataset of Information-Seeking Questions and Answers Anchored in Research Papers](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2105.03011/) (2021)
- [Set-of-Mark Prompting Unleashes Extraordinary Visual Grounding in GPT-4V](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.11441/) (2023)
- [Jailbreak in pieces: Compositional Adversarial Attacks on Multi-Modal Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.14539/) (2023)
- [UI-TARS-2 Technical Report: Advancing GUI Agent with Multi-Turn Reinforcement Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.02544/) (2025)
- [WebDancer: Towards Autonomous Information Seeking Agency](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.22648/) (2025)
- [WebAgent-R1: Training Web Agents via End-to-End Multi-Turn Reinforcement Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.16421/) (2025)
- [WASP: Benchmarking Web Agent Security Against Prompt Injection Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.18575/) (2025)
- [EIA: Environmental Injection Attack on Generalist Web Agents for Privacy Leakage](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2409.11295/) (2024)
- [DataSentinel: A Game-Theoretic Detection of Prompt Injection Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.11358/) (2025)
- [Llama Guard 3 Vision: Safeguarding Human-AI Image Understanding Conversations](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2411.10414/) (2024)
- [The Attacker Moves Second: Stronger Adaptive Attacks Bypass Defenses Against Llm Jailbreaks and Prompt Injections](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.09023/) (2025)
- [Attacking Vision-Language Computer Agents via Pop-ups](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2411.02391/) (2024)
- [LongCoder: A Long-Range Pre-trained Language Model for Code Completion](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.14893/) (2023)
- [PromptArmor: Simple yet Effective Prompt Injection Defenses](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2507.15219/) (2025)
- [Words or Vision: Do Vision-Language Models Have Blind Faith in Text?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.02199/) (2025)

## Built on by (most cited first, 4 of 4)

- [AliMark: Enhancing Robustness of Sentence-Level Watermarking Against Text Paraphrasing](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.29434/) (2026)
- [Same-Origin Policy for Agentic Browsers](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.14027/) (2026)
- [AgentAntibody: An Adaptive Immune System for Defending LLM Agents against Prompt Injection](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.04053/) (2026)
- [AdvSim2Real : Training Web Agents Against Adaptive Prompt Injection in a Web World Model](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.08773/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Web agents can autonomously complete online tasks by interacting with websites, but their exposure to open web environments makes them vulnerable to prompt injection attacks embedded in HTML content or visual interfaces. Existing guard models still suffer from limited generalization to unseen domains and attack patterns, high false positive rates on benign content, reduced deployment efficiency due to added latency at each step, and vulnerability to adversarial attacks that evolve over time or directly target the guard itself. To address these limitations, we propose WARD (Web Agent Robust Defense against Prompt Injection), a practical guard model for secure and efficient web agents. WARD is built on WARD-Base, a large-scale dataset with around 177K samples collected from 719 high-traffic URLs and platforms, and WARD-PIG, a dedicated dataset designed for prompt injection attacks targeting the guard model. We further introduce A3T, an adaptive adversarial attack training framework that iteratively strengthens WARD through a memory-based attacker and guard co-evolution process. Extensive experiments show that WARD achieves nearly perfect recall on out-of-distribution benchmarks, maintains low false positive rates to preserve agent utility, remains robust against guard-targeted and adaptive attacks under substantial distribution shifts, and runs efficiently in parallel with the agent without introducing additional latency.