# Quantifying Cyber-Vulnerability in Power Electronics Systems via an Impedance-Based Attack Reachable Domain

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.14502 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.14502/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 1 of its 12 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 14 May 2026.

## Builds on (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Participation Analysis in Impedance Models: The Grey-Box Approach for Power System Stability](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2102.04226/) (2021)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Power electronics systems are increasingly exposed to cyber threats due to their integration with digital controllers and communication networks. However, an attacker-oriented metric is still lacking to quantify the extent to which a node can be pushed toward instability within a privilege-constrained action space. This letter proposes an impedance-based Attack Reachable Domain (ARD) framework that maps feasible adversarial actions to critical-eigenvalue migration through impedance reshaping. Based on the ARD, an Attack Penetration Index is defined to quantify node-level cyber-vulnerability by jointly characterizing the penetration of the nominal stability margin and the accessibility of successful destabilizing attacks within a privilege-constrained action space. To make the proposed assessment computable when inverter models are unavailable, a practical gray-box workflow is further established by integrating existing impedance identification and differentiable surrogate tools. Case studies on a 4-bus system and a modified IEEE 39-bus system show that coordinated cross-layer manipulations are markedly more damaging than isolated single-layer attacks, and that the proposed metric reveals vulnerability patterns that cannot be inferred from grid-strength indicators.