# Quantifying LLM Safety Degradation Under Repeated Attacks Using Survival Analysis

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.12869 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.12869/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Jailbreaking, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security.
- Builds on 7 of its 17 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 13 May 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM safety and security / [Jailbreaking](https://mlsanity.com/safety/jailbreaking/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 7 of 7)

- [Language Models are Few-Shot Learners](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2005.14165/) (2020)
- [Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.15043/) (2023)
- [Jailbroken: How Does LLM Safety Training Fail?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.02483/) (2023)
- [Jailbreaking ChatGPT via Prompt Engineering: An Empirical Study](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.13860/) (2023)
- [WildGuard: Open One-Stop Moderation Tools for Safety Risks, Jailbreaks, and Refusals of LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.18495/) (2024)
- [HarmMetric Eval: Benchmarking Metrics and Judges for LLM Harmfulness Assessment](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.24384/) (2025)
- [Time-To-Inconsistency: A Survival Analysis of Large Language Model Robustness to Adversarial Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.02712/) (2025)

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [False Floors: LLM Safety Routing Evaluations Break Under Distribution Shift](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.01535/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in a wide range of applications, yet remain vulnerable to adversarial jailbreak attacks that circumvent their safety guardrails. Existing evaluation frameworks typically report binary success/failure metrics, failing to capture the temporal dynamics of how attacks succeed under persistent adversarial pressure. This preliminary work proposes a novel evaluation framework that applies survival analysis techniques to characterize LLM jailbreak vuln`erability. Our approach models the time-to-jailbreak as a survival outcome, enabling estimation of hazard functions, survival curves, and risk factors associated with successful attacks. We evaluate three LLMs against a subset of prompts from the HarmBench dataset spanning three attack categories. Our analysis reveals that models exhibit distinct vulnerability profiles: while one model demonstrates rapid degradation under iterative attacks, the two other models show consistent moderate vulnerability. Our framework provides actionable insights for model and LLM application developers and establishes survival analysis as a rigorous methodology for LLM safety evaluation.