# Can a Single Message Paralyze the AI Infrastructure? The Rise of AbO-DDoS Attacks through Targeted Mobius Injection

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.11442 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.11442/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 28 of its 56 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 12 May 2026.

## Builds on (most cited first, 28 of 28)

- [Qwen3 Technical Report](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.09388/) (2025)
- [ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2210.03629/) (2022)
- [Evaluating Large Language Models Trained on Code](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2107.03374/) (2021)
- [Toolformer: Language Models Can Teach Themselves to Use Tools](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.04761/) (2023)
- [Lost in the Middle: How Language Models Use Long Contexts](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.03172/) (2023)
- [SWE-bench: Can Language Models Resolve Real-World GitHub Issues?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.06770/) (2023)
- [Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.15043/) (2023)
- [A Survey on Large Language Model based Autonomous Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.11432/) (2023)
- [WebArena: A Realistic Web Environment for Building Autonomous Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.13854/) (2023)
- [AutoGen: Enabling Next-Gen LLM Applications via Multi-Agent Conversation](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.08155/) (2023)
- [Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injection](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2302.12173/) (2023)
- [OpenHands: An Open Platform for AI Software Developers as Generalist Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.16741/) (2024)
- [DeepSeek-V3.2: Pushing the Frontier of Open Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2512.02556/) (2025)
- [Prompt Injection attack against LLM-integrated Applications](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.05499/) (2023)
- [LLMLingua: Compressing Prompts for Accelerated Inference of Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.05736/) (2023)
- [Benchmarking and Defending Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.14197/) (2023)
- [Beyond Browsing: API-Based Web Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.16464/) (2024)
- [Prompt Stealing Attacks Against Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.12959/) (2024)
- [Nemotron 3 Super: Open, Efficient Mixture-of-Experts Hybrid Mamba-Transformer Model for Agentic Reasoning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.12374/) (2026)
- [Denial-of-Service Poisoning Attacks against Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.10760/) (2024)
- [Crabs: Consuming Resource via Auto-generation for LLM-DoS Attack under Black-box Settings](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2412.13879/) (2024)
- [ClawBench: Can AI Agents Complete Everyday Online Tasks?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.08523/) (2026)
- [Taming OpenClaw: Security Analysis and Mitigation of Autonomous LLM Agent Threats](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2603.11619/) (2026)
- [Agentic AI Security: Threats, Defenses, Evaluation, and Open Challenges](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.23883/) (2025)
- [ThinkTrap: Denial-of-Service Attacks against Black-box LLM Services via Infinite Thinking](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2512.07086/) (2025)
- [Breaking the Loop: Detecting and Mitigating Denial-of-Service Vulnerabilities in Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2503.00416/) (2025)
- [Transferable Direct Prompt Injection via Activation-Guided MCMC Sampling](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2509.07617/) (2025)
- [PD3F: A Pluggable and Dynamic DoS-Defense Framework Against Resource Consumption Attacks Targeting Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.18680/) (2025)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Large Language Model (LLM) agents have emerged as key intermediaries, orchestrating complex interactions between human users and a wide range of digital services and LLM infrastructures. While prior research has extensively examined the security of LLMs and agents in isolation, the systemic risk of the agent acting as a disruptive hub within the user-agent-service chain remains largely overlooked. In this work, we expose a novel threat paradigm by introducing Mobius Injection, a sophisticated attack that weaponizes autonomous agents into zombie nodes to launch what we define as gent-based and -Oriented DDoS (AbO-DDoS) attacks. By exploiting a structural vulnerability in agentic logic named Semantic Closure, an adversary can induce sustained recursive execution of agent components through a single textual injection. We demonstrate that this attack is exceptionally lightweight, stealthy against both traditional DDoS monitors and contemporary AI safety filters, and highly configurable, allowing for surgical targeting of specific environments or model providers. To evaluate the real-world impact, we conduct extensive experiments across three representative claw-style agents and three mainstream coding agents, integrated with 12 frontier proprietary or open-weight LLMs. Our results demonstrate that Mobius Injection achieves substantial attack success across diverse tasks, driving single-node call amplification up to 51.0x and multi-node p95 latency inflation up to 229.1x. The attack performance exhibits a superlinear increase with the number of poisoning nodes. To mitigate Mobius Injection, we propose a proactive defense mechanism using Agent Component Energy (ACE) Analysis, which detects malicious recursive triggers by measuring anomalous energy in the agent's component graph.