# When Agents Overtrust Environmental Evidence: An Extensible Agentic Framework for Benchmarking Evidence-Grounding Defects in LLM Agents

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.08828 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.08828/

## Key facts

- Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use.
- Builds on 17 of its 22 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 9 May 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM agents and tool use / [Agent threats, guardrails and governance](https://mlsanity.com/agents/agent-threats-guardrails-and-governance/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 17 of 17)

- [ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2210.03629/) (2022)
- [ToolLLM: Facilitating Large Language Models to Master 16000+ Real-world APIs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.16789/) (2023)
- [τ-bench: A Benchmark for Tool-Agent-User Interaction in Real-World Domains](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.12045/) (2024)
- [AgentBench: Evaluating LLMs as Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2308.03688/) (2023)
- [OSWorld: Benchmarking Multimodal Agents for Open-Ended Tasks in Real Computer Environments](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.07972/) (2024)
- [OpenHands: An Open Platform for AI Software Developers as Generalist Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.16741/) (2024)
- [API-Bank: A Comprehensive Benchmark for Tool-Augmented LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.08244/) (2023)
- [Identifying the Risks of LM Agents with an LM-Emulated Sandbox](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.15817/) (2023)
- [InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.02691/) (2024)
- [AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.09024/) (2024)
- [AgentPoison: Red-teaming LLM Agents via Poisoning Memory or Knowledge Bases](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.12784/) (2024)
- [Agent Security Bench (ASB): Formalizing and Benchmarking Attacks and Defenses in LLM-based Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2410.02644/) (2024)
- [TheAgentCompany: Benchmarking LLM Agents on Consequential Real World Tasks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2412.14161/) (2024)
- [WASP: Benchmarking Web Agent Security Against Prompt Injection Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2504.18575/) (2025)
- [Model Context Protocol (MCP) at First Glance: Studying the Security and Maintainability of MCP Servers](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.13538/) (2025)
- [Beyond the Protocol: Unveiling Attack Vectors in the Model Context Protocol (MCP) Ecosystem](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.02040/) (2025)
- [Attacks on Third-Party APIs of Large Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.16891/) (2024)

## Built on by (most cited first, 3 of 3)

- [Post-Edit Re-Verification in Simulator-Backed Engineering Agents: A Controlled Comparison of Verification-Cadence Guidance](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2608.28147/) (2026)
- [When Agent Context Goes Stale: Incoherence in Volatile Agent Context](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.05281/) (2026)
- [From Evidence to Action: How Tool-Using Agents Fail](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2610.07753/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Large language model agents increasingly operate through environment-facing scaffolds that expose files, web pages, APIs, and logs. These observations influence tool use, state tracking, and action sequencing, yet their reliability and authority are often uncertain. Environmental grounding is therefore a systems-level problem involving context admission, evidence provenance, freshness checking, verification policy, action gating, and model reasoning. Existing agent benchmarks mainly evaluate task capability or specific attacks such as prompt injection and memory poisoning, but they under-specify a fundamental reliability question: whether agents remain grounded in the true environment state when observations are stale, incorrect, or malicious. We introduce EnvTrustBench, an agentic framework for benchmarking this failure mode. We define an evidence-grounding defect (EGD) as a behavioral failure in which an agent treats an environment-facing claim as sufficient evidence for action without resolving it against available current evidence, leading to a task-incorrect false path under the true environment state. Given a task scenario, EnvTrustBench generates the workspace, environment, agent-facing objective, and validation oracle, executes the evaluated agent, records its action-observation trajectory and final state, and applies the oracle to produce a verdict. Using 6 LLM backbones and 5 widely used scaffolds, we evaluate 55 generated cases across 11 task scenarios, with each scenario expanded through five feedback-guided generation iterations. Results show that EGDs consistently emerge across operational workflows, highlighting environmental grounding as a core agent reliability problem with important security implications.