# Autonomous Adversary: Red-Teaming in the age of LLM

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.06486 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2605.06486/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use.
- Builds on 6 of its 10 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 7 May 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM agents and tool use / [Agent threats, guardrails and governance](https://mlsanity.com/agents/agent-threats-guardrails-and-governance/)
- LLM safety and security / [Prompt injection and agent security](https://mlsanity.com/safety/prompt-injection-and-agent-security/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 6 of 6)

- [Cybench: A Framework for Evaluating Cybersecurity Capabilities and Risks of Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2408.08926/) (2024)
- [AutoAttacker: A Large Language Model Guided System to Implement Automatic Cyber-attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2403.01038/) (2024)
- [Forewarned is Forearmed: A Survey on Large Language Model-based Agents in Autonomous Cyberattacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2505.12786/) (2025)
- [Towards Effective Offensive Security LLM Agents: Hyperparameter Tuning, LLM as a Judge, and a Lightweight CTF Benchmark](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2508.05674/) (2025)
- [Cybersecurity AI Benchmark (CAIBench): A Meta-Benchmark for Evaluating Cybersecurity AI Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2510.24317/) (2025)
- [From Promise to Peril: Rethinking Cybersecurity Red and Blue Teaming in the Age of LLMs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2506.13434/) (2025)

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Where Cyber Agents Struggle: Bottleneck Analysis of Multi-Stage LLM Agents](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2609.28572/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Language Model Agents (LMAs) are emerging as a powerful primitive for augmenting red-team operations. They can support attack planning, adversary emulation, and the orchestration of multi-step activity such as lateral movement, a core enabling capability of advanced persistent threat (APT) campaigns. Using frameworks such as MITRE ATT&CK, we analyze where these agents intersect with core offensive functions and assess current strengths and limitations of LMAs with an emphasis on governance and realistic evaluation. We benchmark LMAs across two lateral-movement scenarios in a controlled adversary-emulation environment, where LMAs interact with instrumented cyber agents, observe execution artifacts, and iteratively adapt based on environmental feedback. Each scenario is formalized as an ordered task chain with explicit validation predicates, leveraging an LLM-as-a-Judge paradigm to ensure deterministic outcome verification. We compare three operational modalities: fully autonomous execution, self-scaffolded planning, and expert-defined action plans. Preliminary findings indicate that expert-defined action plans yield higher task-completion rates relative to other operational modes. However, failure remains frequent across all modalities, largely attributable to brittle command invocation, environmental and deployment instability, and recurring errors in credential management and state handling.