# Perturbation Probing: A Two-Pass-per-Prompt Diagnostic for FFN Behavioral Circuits in Aligned LLMs

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.27401 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.27401/

## Key facts

- Cited by 1 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Placed in Safety alignment and jailbreak attacks, one of 10 directions in LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation.
- Builds on 35 of its 45 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 30 Apr 2026.

## Placed in

- LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation / [Safety alignment and jailbreak attacks](https://mlsanity.com/alignment/safety-alignment-and-jailbreak-attacks/)
- Mechanistic interpretability / [Steering and probing for LLM safety](https://mlsanity.com/mechinterp/steering-and-probing-for-llm-safety/)

## Builds on (most cited first, 30 of 35)

- [Training language models to follow instructions with human feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2203.02155/) (2022)
- [The Llama 3 Herd of Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2407.21783/) (2024)
- [Direct Preference Optimization: Your Language Model is Secretly a Reward Model](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.18290/) (2023)
- [A Unified Approach to Interpreting Model Predictions](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1705.07874/) (2017)
- [Qwen2.5 Technical Report](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2412.15115/) (2024)
- [Training a Helpful and Harmless Assistant with Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2204.05862/) (2022)
- [Axiomatic Attribution for Deep Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1703.01365/) (2017)
- [Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.15043/) (2023)
- [TruthfulQA: Measuring How Models Mimic Human Falsehoods](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2109.07958/) (2021)
- [Neural Machine Translation of Rare Words with Subword Units](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1508.07909/) (2015)
- [Locating and Editing Factual Associations in GPT](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2202.05262/) (2022)
- [GLU Variants Improve Transformer](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2002.05202/) (2020)
- [Jailbroken: How Does LLM Safety Training Fail?](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2307.02483/) (2023)
- [Learning Important Features Through Propagating Activation Differences](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1704.02685/) (2017)
- [HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusal](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.04249/) (2024)
- [Sparse Autoencoders Find Highly Interpretable Features in Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2309.08600/) (2023)
- [Representation Engineering: A Top-Down Approach to AI Transparency](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.01405/) (2023)
- [Inference-Time Intervention: Eliciting Truthful Answers from a Language Model](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.03341/) (2023)
- [Interpretability in the Wild: a Circuit for Indirect Object Identification in GPT-2 small](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2211.00593/) (2022)
- [Steering Llama 2 via Contrastive Activation Addition](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2312.06681/) (2023)
- [Refusal in Language Models Is Mediated by a Single Direction](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2406.11717/) (2024)
- [Mass-Editing Memory in a Transformer](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2210.07229/) (2022)
- [Probing Classifiers: Promises, Shortcomings, and Advances](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2102.12452/) (2021)
- [Discovering Latent Knowledge in Language Models Without Supervision](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2212.03827/) (2022)
- [Towards Automated Circuit Discovery for Mechanistic Interpretability](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2304.14997/) (2023)
- [The Geometry of Truth: Emergent Linear Structure in Large Language Model Representations of True/False Datasets](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2310.06824/) (2023)
- [Taskonomy: Disentangling Task Transfer Learning](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1804.08328/) (2018)
- [Jailbreaking Leading Safety-Aligned LLMs with Simple Adaptive Attacks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2404.02151/) (2024)
- [Finding Neurons in a Haystack: Case Studies with Sparse Probing](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2305.01610/) (2023)
- [Do Llamas Work in English? On the Latent Language of Multilingual Transformers](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2402.10588/) (2024)

## Built on by (most cited first, 1 of 1)

- [Leverage Is Not Reach: A Control-Window Law for Single-Neuron Steering in Language Models](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2606.19831/) (2026)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Perturbation probing generates task-specific causal hypotheses for FFN neurons in large language models using two forward passes per prompt and no backpropagation, followed by a one-time intervention sweep of about 150 passes amortized across all identified neurons. Across eight behavioral circuits, 13 models, and four architecture families, we identify two circuit structures that organize LLM behavior. Opposition circuits appear when RLHF suppresses a pre-training tendency. In safety refusal, about 50 neurons, or 0.014 percent of all neurons, control the refusal template; ablating them changes 80 percent of response formats on 520 AdvBench prompts while producing near-zero harmful compliance, 3 of 520 cases, all with disclaimers. Routing circuits appear for pre-training behaviors distributed through attention. For language selection, residual-stream direction injection switches English to Chinese output on 99.1 percent of 580 benchmark prompts in the 3 of 19 tested models that satisfy three observed conditions: bilingual training, FFN-to-skip signal ratio between 0.3 and 1.1, and linear representability. The same intervention fails on the other 16 models and on math, code, and factual circuits, defining the limits of directional steering. The FFN-to-skip signal ratio, computed from the same two forward passes, distinguishes the two structures and predicts the appropriate intervention. Circuit topology varies by architecture, from Qwen's concentrated FFN bottleneck to Gemma's normalization-shielded circuit. In Qwen3.5-2B, ablating 20 neurons eliminates multi-turn sycophantic capitulation, while amplifying 10 related neurons improves factual correction from 52 percent to 88 percent on 200 TruthfulQA prompts. These results show that perturbation probing offers mechanistic insight into RLHF-organized behavior and a practical toolkit for precision template-layer editing.