# Do Transaction-Level and Actor-Level AML Queues Agree? An Empirical Evaluation of Granularity Effects on the Elliptic++ Graph

arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.23494 · HTML: https://mlsanity.com/paper/2604.23494/

## Key facts

- No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026).
- Builds on 12 of its 34 references that are in the map.
- First posted on arXiv 26 Apr 2026.

## Builds on (most cited first, 12 of 12)

- [Semi-Supervised Classification with Graph Convolutional Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1609.02907/) (2016)
- [Graph Attention Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1710.10903/) (2017)
- [Inductive Representation Learning on Large Graphs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1706.02216/) (2017)
- [Modeling Relational Data with Graph Convolutional Networks](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1703.06103/) (2017)
- [Heterogeneous Graph Attention Network](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1903.07293/) (2019)
- [Heterogeneous Graph Transformer](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2003.01332/) (2020)
- [EvolveGCN: Evolving Graph Convolutional Networks for Dynamic Graphs](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1902.10191/) (2019)
- [Anti-Money Laundering in Bitcoin: Experimenting with Graph Convolutional Networks for Financial Forensics](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1908.02591/) (2019)
- [Machine learning methods to detect money laundering in the Bitcoin blockchain in the presence of label scarcity](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2005.14635/) (2020)
- [Demystifying Fraudulent Transactions and Illicit Nodes in the Bitcoin Network for Financial Forensics](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2306.06108/) (2023)
- [GuiltyWalker: Distance to illicit nodes in the Bitcoin network](https://mlsanity.com/paper/2102.05373/) (2021)
- [An Evaluation of Bitcoin Address Classification based on Transaction History Summarization](https://mlsanity.com/paper/1903.07994/) (2019)

## Abstract (arXiv)

Graph-based anti-money laundering (AML) systems on blockchain networks can score suspicious activity at two granularity levels -- transactions or actor addresses -- yet compliance action is conducted per actor. This paper contributes an evaluation methodology for measuring how scoring granularity affects investigation queue composition under fixed review budgets. We formalize the evaluation through a projection framework mapping transaction-level scores to the actor-level action unit via four aggregation operators, and introduce budgeted investigation metrics -- yield@budget, burden decomposition, and case fragmentation. Using the public Elliptic++ Bitcoin dataset (203,769 transactions; 822,942 address occurrences), we train independent random forest classifiers at each level under a causal temporal protocol and compare review queues through Jaccard overlap, burden decomposition, and feature-matching ablations. At one-percent budget, temporal evaluation yields mean Jaccard of 0.374 (SD 0.171); static pooled evaluation yields 0.087 (95% CI [0.079, 0.094]). An enriched address model receiving all 237 features produces even lower overlap (Jaccard=0.051), with 4.3% illicit per 100 reviews versus 30.2% for the transaction-projected queue. Address-level detection value is temporally concentrated: two timesteps exceed 91% illicit per 100 reviews while the static burden is only 3.4%. A fixed hybrid policy underperforms the best single-level queue by 5.05pp (CI [-10.2pp, -0.9pp]). These findings establish that scoring granularity is a consequential design variable for AML investigation systems -- same data, same budget, different queues, different addresses investigated.